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I
INTRODUCTION

Medical malpractice cases form a distinctive part of the litigation
landscape. The simple fact that the defendants are doctors-something of a
discrete and insular minority in the litigation world-assures an interested
audience as the medical establishment seeks to minimize the impact of
litigation on the workings of the profession. As could be expected, the
medical profession's view, shared by many others, is harshly critical of the
litigation system; members of the profession assert that it is expensive, slow,
and unreliable.' This article is intended to focus on the contributions of
empirical analysis in understanding how malpractice cases are litigated,
2
primarily by providing an agenda of useful research to be performed.
For at least the past fifteen years, it is clear that the concern with
malpractice liability has included a distinctly procedural aspect. In response
to the criticisms of the litigation system, some state legislatures have
conferred a special status on malpractice cases by enacting a variety of
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I. These observations do not necessarily serve to distinguish medical malpractice cases from
other areas of litigation; complaints have been made for a long time that litigation generally is
expensive, slow, and unreliable. Nonetheless, the criticisms draw a measure of support from
commentators who typically use malpractice litigation as a prime example of the "litigation crisis."
See, e.g., J. LIEBERMAN, THEF LITIGIOUS SOCIETN 66-94 (1981).
2. Many of these specific concerns are suggested by a research project in which I serve as a coprincipal investigator. The research, begun in july 1987, seeks to analyze the dynamics of the
litigation process as well as to develop efficient means of alternative dispute resolution for
malpractice cases. Lo accomplish these ends, researchers are reviewing all medical malpractice cases
filed in North Carolina courts over a three-year period, a total sample size of approximately 950
cases. For each case, researchers are reviewing court files to collect data on the nature of the claim
and the procedural history of the litigation. A number of preliminary observations are presented in
this article. Formal findings should be available in early 1990.
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procedural changes. 3 In some instances, these changes have involved
supplementing the existing process by imposing new mechanisms, such as the
"screening panel" approach enacted in many states in the 1970's in order to
discourage the filing of non-meritorious claims. Similarly, some legislatures
have enacted legislation to promote arbitration as an alternative to
malpractice litigation. Other changes have constituted more of a procedural
fine-tuning to correct perceived problems in the current approach. Thus,
some states have imposed special pleading requirements in malpractice cases,
4
restructured the discovery process, or limited those able to serve as experts.
Current reform proposals reinforce the procedural critique-the American
Medical Association, for example, recently urged replacing the existing
5
system with an alternative set of administrative procedures.
This intensity of concern and activity makes malpractice an important
context for reviewing the contribution, both actual and potential, of empirical
research in understanding the litigation process. What do we in fact know
about the workings of the procedural system in medical malpractice cases? A
review of the literature shows that the actual quantum of empirical research is
surprisingly sparse. In part, scarcity reflects a lack of empirical analysis
generally on the subject of malpractice," but it also results from the inherent
7
difficulties in conducting research on procedural issues.
One problem lies in the difficulty of obtaining detailed and complete
information. Medical malpractice cases are litigated predominantly in state
courts. Within each state, the cases are geographically allocated among
scores of county courts. Thus, to the extent that one begins with court
records, reviewing a large number of cases is burdensome. Moreover, no one
data source can answer all or even most of the questions presented. In hotly
3. For information generally on the subject of legislative reform in the malpractice arena,
including a discussion of procedural changes, see Ackerman, Vedical .alpractice: A Time for .More Talk
and Less Rhetoric, 37 MERCER I. REV. 725 (1986); Robinson, The .Medical Valpractice Crisis of the 1970's.
.4 Retrospective I,AW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5. See generally Gellhorn, .Medical .1Malpractice
Litigation ('.S.) - Medical Vishap Compensation (,V.Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REV. 170, 170-77 (1988).
4. As an example of procedural responses, one could cite the North Carolina General
Assembly's recently enacted series of procedural changes requiring greater judicial control over
discovery applicable only in medical malpractice cases. See 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 859.
5. AMA, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO TilE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEIM FOR RESOLVING MEDICAl.
IiABILIrY

)ISPUTES:

A FAULr-BASED,

ADMINISTRATIVE

SYSTEM (ANIA/Specialty Society Medical

Liability Project Report, 1988). Other recent proposals have also focused upon procedural reform.
See. e.g.. FLORIDA ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND FORT SYSTEMS, MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

15-30 (Nov. 1987) (describing plan for prompt resolution of claims

including complex provisions for arbitration, pre-filing investigations, and sanctions).
6. A recent survey of empirical work over the entire range of issues concluded that
"lqluantitative analysts and scholars have thus contributed far less to malpractice debates than have
interest groups and professionals applying expert opinion." Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg,
Information on .lalpractice: .1 Review of Empirical Research oii Vajor Polic), Issues, I.A, & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1986. at 85, 110. For a focused discussion of research questions across the range of
malpractice issues, see U.S. )EP'T OF HEALTii ANi) HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
IEDICAi.

l.IABILITY

AND MALPRACTICE

179-209

(1987)

[hereinafter

HHS

REPORT].

See geneiallv

Bovbjerg, Legislation on 11edical Mlalpractice: Firther Developmenls and a Preliiay Report Card, 22 U.C.
DAVIS .. REV. 499 (1989).
7.

See P. EBENER, COURT EFFOwrs TO REDUCE

diflicuties with empirical research in litigation).

PRETRIAL DELAY

81-82 (1981)

(cataloguing
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contested cases, court files are replete with information; in other cases, these
records are often sparse and unhelpful. Insurance company files-to the
extent that the researcher can overcome access problems-are a useful
repository of information on the claim and the settlement process, but are less
useful on other procedural details. Ultimately, the lawyers' files are most
often the best source of data, but concerns of confidentiality and their
scattered location limit the researcher's access to that source for any
significant number of cases. Even when quality information is available, the
time needed to analyze each case is extensive; a moderately complex
malpractice case may contain several hundred pages of relevant material.
Another problem is that the focus of most empirical research relating to
malpractice has been obscured. On the one hand, some of the reltevant
empirical work-particularly research on jury performance-has not been
focused specifically on malpractice cases, but rather has cut across a wide
range of civil litigation contexts.

The small number of malpractice cases

reviewed makes it difficult to assess the jury's role in resolving malpractice
disputes. On the other hand, research on specific malpractice procedures,
such as screening panels, has not been adequately related to broader
procedural issues.
Another difficulty involves the failure of the system's critics-both
researchers and non-researchers alike-to conceptualize and adequately
specify the goals of a procedural system. Without such conceptualizations,
one lacks a yardstick against which to measure performance. To establish a
working framework for analysis, this article begins with the basic assumption
that the function of a procedural system is generally to resolve disputes fairly
and efficiently." Fairness and efficiency, however, are relative terms that can
be conceptualized on a number of levels and from multiple perspectives."'
This article's primary concern is with how the procedural system operates in

processing specific disputes serving three primary functions.'
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (rules to be "construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action"). Cf Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1. 14 (1941) (describing
"procedure" as "the judicial process fir enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress foir disregard or infraction of them").
9. Seegenerall v E. LIND & 1. I' L"R, TIiE SOCIAl. P)SYCIOLOGY OF lPROCEI)URAI JtUSTICiE (1988):J.
[HIBAUT & L. WAI.KER, PROCFDURAL. JUSTICE (1975). See also I)amaska, Structures of .luthority and
Coomparative Criminal Procedure. 84 YAF. I,.J. 483 (1975): Langbein. Tie German Advana(ge in Civil
Procedure. 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985).
10. Certainly, one could articulate the goals differently. For example, the recent report by the
Department of Health and Human Services posits eight different objectives relating to the overall
workings of the malpractice system. Of" these objectives, three relate directly to the litigation
process, suggesting that a compensation system should: (1) "resolve claims promptly and in
amounts proportional to the injury:" (2) "provide predictable outcomes;" and (3) "operate
efficiently in terms of financial costs, professional energies, and governmental processes." HHS
REPORT, sUrna note 6, at 18-19. This article's approach captures most of these elements, although
perhaps in a form that is more directly focused upon specific procedural devices and methods.
One element not directly captured by the formulation, but informing all three articulated goals, is
the concern with cost itself. Certainly, the high cost of malpractice litigation is itself a major
problem. See J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSA'ION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 55 (1986)
(showing that litigation costs For defendants in litigated malpractice cases constituted 29.6% of the
average compensation obtained by plaintiffs); 1). YAGGY & P. HODGSON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 21
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The first function is to provide a mechanism or mechanisms for
expeditiously handling non-meritorious cases, which if permitted to run the
procedural gauntlet could result in significant expense to the parties. The
appropriate procedural response to non-meritorious cases can vary. In the
past, the motion to dismiss targeted at the sufficiency of the complaint was
frequently seen as fulfilling this function. Under the modern approach
exhibited by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (with similar provisions in
force in most states), other mechanisms-most notably the motion for
summary judgment or the imposition of sanctions for filing frivolous claimsare more specifically intended to deal with non-meritorious cases. The
empirical question is whether these mechanisms work to conclude nonmeritorious cases in a reasonably prompt manner without seriously impacting
the assertion of arguably valid claims.
A second function is to provide the parties a structured forum for the
voluntary resolution of meritorious claims, that is, settlement. Several aspects
of the procedural system are at least indirectly implicated in the settlement
process. Certainly, one purpose of the current liberal approach to pretrial
discovery is to permit access to information necessary to evaluate a claim.
Other procedural innovations, such as grants of authority to the judiciary to
conduct pretrial conferences and the growing use of alternative dispute
resolution methods, also impact upon settlement practices.
Finally, a third function is to resolve those potentially meritorious cases
that are not voluntarily settled. At a minimum, this function requires a
method for finding facts and applying relevant law. The desired
decisionmaking qualities include competency of the decisionmaker as well as
consistency of decisions across cases. Given constitutional commands, the
procedural choice is the institution of the jury. Due to its members' lack of
expertise, the use of the jury as the predominant means of decisionmaking has
raised serious questions as to whether the desired qualities of competence
and consistency are attainable.
Viewed within the context of these functions, the purpose of empirical
research is not only to describe how the system works, but also to provide
evidence to permit an assessment of how well these functions are being
fulfilled. This assessment must be made in relative terms; no system can
realistically be expected to process disputes perfectly. For example, some
non-meritorious cases will not be dismissed expeditiously. Judgments about
the efficacy of the system, therefore, require some consideration of the degree
(1987) [hereinafter PRIVATE SECTOR CONFERENCE] ("Huge awards are few and far between and often
deserved. We are plagued with the high cost of the system: the cost of handling claims and
attorneys' fees and the burden applied.") (statement of William Ginsburg); HHS REPORT, slupra note
6, at 16. Certainly, a claim could be made that minimizing transaction costs should be put forward as
a primary goal. Cost, however, is not directly controlled by the procedures offered, but rather by a
combination of voluntary and involuntary actions by the attorneys involved. Moreover, a procedural
system that fifills the identified primary functions well would seem by definition to be efficient,
regardless of the cost of operation, which would require some benchmark for comparison in any
event.
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of error or inefficiency that is tolerable, and, equally important, the likely
performance of any suggested alternatives.
This article is intended to offer some measure of clarity and, hopefully,
imagination on the utility of empirical research in studying the litigation
process. The discussion is divided analytically according to the three
functions identified above: handling non-meritorious litigation, fostering the
settlement process, and resolving cases by jury. Each section begins with a
brief sampling of the procedural criticisms or concerns frequently leveled
against the current system, followed by a review of relevant empirical studies,
and some prescriptions for sharpening the research focus.
II
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES ON NON-MERITORIOUS

LITIGATION

A repeated complaint about the litigation system is that it tolerates, indeed
perhaps even fosters, non-meritorious litigation. While this argument is often
not well focused in terms of identifying which specific features of the
procedural system are at fault, the concern is clear enough: Defendants seem
to prevail in most malpractice cases, but only after incurring substantial
expense and frustration. ''
In assessing this complaint, one is immediately confronted with a major
2
definitional problem: What is meant by the term non-meritorious litigation?'
Potential nominees could include cases terminated by a variety of procedural
methods ranging from a motion to dismiss at the onset of the case to a jury
verdict favoring the doctor after a full trial.'
Critics tend to equate cases
terminated in favor of defendants with those cases being frivolous. Using a
11.

See P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:

THEORN, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 18 (1985)

(noting "widespread belief that most malpractice claims simply reflect the unrealistic expectations of
litigious patients, who sue whenever the results of health care intervention are less than perfect");J.
GUINTIIER, HEALTH CARE AND THE LAW I: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, LAWYERS &JURIEs 5-7 (Papers of the
Roscoe Pound Foundation, 1988) (discussion generally of frivolous litigation, with one insurance
representative noting that "60 percent of all the cases alleging malpractice go nowhere, so that
means 60 percent of them needn't have come"); PRIVATE SECTOR CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 17
("The statistics pretty well show that too many bad cases are brought against physicians.")

(statement of Kirk Johnson); Birnbaum, Physirias Conteatflack. Liabililv of lau'vers for Iistiitting
l'ijustified ledical Ialpractie .Acions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1004 (1977) ("Many physicians
believe that the medical malpractice insurance practice has, in large part, been caused by overzealous
and unethical attorneys who institute groundless malpractice suits.").
12. Another definitional challenge would be to attempt to differentiate between frivolous and
non-meritorious cases. Logically, it would seem that "frivolous" suggests a subset of nonmeritorious cases focusing on an intentional or reckless decision to assert a claim without regard to
available information as to its lack of merit. Beyond that, however, frivolity is probably best
understood in terms of the observer's own sensibilities. For present purposes, this article will focus
on the existence or non-existence of non-meritorious disputes and the litigation system's responses,
leaving the line-drawing as between frivolous and non-meritorious to others.
13. The many' possibilities include cases: (1)dismissed pursuant to a motion to dismiss on the
ground ofjurisdictional defects, bar by statute of limitations, or failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted; (2) dismissed pursuant to a motion for summary judgment; (3) dismissed by
the plaintiff' wUihout prejudice (which indicates no settlement) prior to trial: (4) settled for a nominal
arnount (a so-called nuisance value settlement); and (5) resolved by the jury returning a verdict for
the defendant.
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favorable outcome for the defendant as even a rough proxy for measuring the
amount of non-meritorious litigation is inappropriate, however, for at least
four reasons.
First, in some instances, a plaintiff's claim may reasonably appear
meritorious at the outset only to be revealed as lacking merit as the case
evolves over time. For example, a plaintiff's attorney could reasonably
believe that the suit was meritorious at the time of filing, only to find out some
important fact during discovery that changes the initial evaluation. That the
case is then terminated without payment to the plaintiff does not mean that
the initial pursuit of the claim was unjustified, although its continuation might
be so considered. This point suggests that the challenge faced by the legal
system is not merely identifying non-meritorious cases, but rather anticipating
the evolutionary nature of the inquiry and intervening at appropriate times.
Second, the fact that a lawsuit is dropped may indicate no more than the
fact that the expense of pursuing an otherwise valid claim-perhaps caused by
the defendant's obdurance or structural impediments to obtaining qualified
expert testimony-has proven to be too much for the plaintiff to bear.' 4 This
situation is especially likely to arise if the ultimate recovery, as fullyjustified as
it may be by the physician's negligence, is small. In other cases, the emotional
strain of litigation itself may convince a plaintiff to dismiss a potentially valid
claim.
A third possibility is that the pro-defendant termination was in error.
There are several reasons why potentially meritorious cases may be lost,
including failure to develop evidence during discovery; attorney
incompetence, inexperience, or poor judgment; judicial bias; inability to
obtain competent experts to testify; or simply error by the factfinder.
These first three observations suggest that a study focusing on prodefendant terminations as a measure of non-meritorious litigation is likely to
overestimate the phenomenon. The fourth factor cuts in the other direction
and suggests that the amount of non-meritorious litigation could be
understated. There may well be cases where the plaintiff receives a modest
payment in settlement simply because the insurer's assessment of likely
defense costs or of the risk of an incorrect decision are sufficiently high to
warrant a settlement offer. The existence of such nuisance value settlements
is widely postulated. In addition, a non-meritorious case may be pursued
through to trial and, owing to jury error, be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.
Once again, this possibility is widely suspected.
In combination, these factors establish that focusing solely on the results
of cases cannot serve as even a rough measure of the frequency of nonmeritorious litigation. Absent better information about the nature and
evolution of the dispute, the presence of significant percentages of case
14. Danzon's observation about the high rate of pro-defendant terminations focuses on this
point, noting that the evidence "supports the hypothesis that small malpractice claims are often
barred from recovery because of the high fixed costs of participating in the legal process." P.
DANZON, Snpulw note 11, at 42.
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dispositions favorable to the defendant constitutes mere circumstantial
evidence of the existence of a problem. By the same token, however, to
acknowledge possibly good or at least neutral reasons for plaintiffs' losing or
abandoning claims does not suggest that all is well. Plaintiffs and/or their
attorneys, driven by lack of knowledge about the merits of the claim,
misshapen expectations, or a desire to coerce a nuisance settlement, may
indeed be asserting claims that simply should not be made.
A.

Assessing the Potential for Non-Meritorious Litigation: The Closed
Claims Study

Acknowledging this definitional problem permits us to rephrase the initial
empirical question: Is there evidence for concluding that there is the potential
for a significant amount of non-meritorious litigation? If, in fact, a significant
percentage of cases are terminated in favor of physicians, then the effect is to
shift the burden to explain or justify that fact. On this point, the data do
speak strongly. Existing empirical studies, consisting primarily of closed
claims studies, fairly meet this initial threshold of raising a potential concern.
Given that these studies will be discussed throughout the article, it is
useful to digress briefly and describe the methodology of closed claims
studies. Often conducted by governmental agencies as part of an effort to
analyze instability in the malpractice insurance industry, 1 5 the closed claims
study is designed to collect data on a large number of claims-not just
litigated cases-that are terminated during a specified period.'"l Since many
15. For a general description of the quality of information generally presented in closed claims
studies, see Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 90-91, 97-98.
Methodological problems often present themselves in closed claims studies. A recent effort in
North Carolina is instructive. In response to the recent instability in insurance rates for malpractice
coverage, the North Carolina General Assembly asked the Department of Insurance to prepare a
closed claims study of claims history in North Carolina. Efforts were made to obtain complete
records on all closed claims over a three-year period from 1983 to 1986. Despite the interest in
obtaining complete information, one of the largest insurers provided detailed information on only
half its claims. NORTI CAROLINA DEP'T OF INSURANCE, MEIICAL MALPRACTICE CLOSED CLAIMS STUDY,
1983-1986 (1988). In addition, much of the information sought by the Department was unknown to
the insurers. For example, the insurers were able to respond to an inquiry about whether the
claimant had an expert medical witness in only 430 out of 951 claims reported. Id. at 18 app. 1)
(Table 5.6). A third problem was that the information obtained did not always correspond to what
had been previously reported bv the insurance company in a required annual report. One insurer
had previously indicated that it had not closed anv, claims during the years in question. However,
survey data showed that three claims with losses totaling $1,201,667 had been closed. Id. at 3. Cf
Danzon, The E'ffer/s of Torl Reforms on the Freqnenuy and Severily of ,lledical .llalpacticeClaims, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 413, 414 (1987) (noting methodological problems caused by multiplicity of insurers).
16. Data are usually obtained from insurance company files. Complete data are often collected
on a subset of claims and then extrapolated to the larger sample. In a U.S. General Accounting
Office ("GAO") study, for example, the researchers selected 25 insurers who were willing to
cooperate from the total universe of 102 malpractice insurers. The selection was made on a
randomized basis among different categories by type of insurer company (private carrier, physicianowned insurer, or hospital-owned insurer). The number of claims closed among this subset of
insurers during the year in question totaled over 31,000. After stratifying these claims according to
amount of payment, the GAO randomly selected a varying percentage of claims within each stratum.
Claims were exclhded for several reasons. For example, they were excluded where the insurer was
involved only as a reinsurer, the file was unavailable, or related files were still open. Approximately
2781 files were randomly selected, of which information was collected on 1706 claims with the
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claims are settled or dropped prior to suit being filed, the universe of claims is
significantly broader than litigated cases. This observation is important to
keep in mind if one is attempting to assess the workings of the litigation
system.
A closed claims study's primary purpose is simply to determine how many
malpractice claims were resolved in a given period and the amount paid out
by insurers in compensation; the bulk of the information collected concerns
variables that do not directly relate to the litigation process.1 7 These
summary data are analyzed to describe claim frequency and the amount of
payment, if any. The claims data are then cross-tabulated against other
variables, such as the nature of the claim. Typically, no effort is made to
determine whether medical negligence in fact occurred in a particular case, ',
or whether the dispute was efficiently handled. In short, the basic point of the
closed claims study is to describe who asserted the claim, what injuries were
alleged, and how much the claimant received.
Closed claims studies demonstrate that a high percentage of malpractice
claims terminate without payment to the plaintiff. Indeed, at first blush, the
evidence seems overwhelming. According to the General Accounting Office's
("GAO") recent study of claims closed in 1984, more than half of all
malpractice claims closed without payment to the plaintiff.'" This statistic is
generally confirmed by other studies,2 1) but requires explanation. There is no
universal definition of a "claim"; claims are not limited to situations in which
lawsuits have been filed or even to where the claimant has retained an
remainder being found ineligible for some reason. From this relatively small group, the data were
extrapolated to describe 73,500 claims, the total projected number of claims closed in 1984. HUMAN
RESOURCES

Div.,

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAl MALPRACTICE:

CIIARACTERISTICS OF

CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984, at 14-17 (1987) [hereinafter GAO REPORTI.
Earlier studies used a similar approach. See Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, .MIediral .MIalpractice
Insurance Claims Files Closed in 1970, in DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, RFPORT OF THIE
SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

app. at I, 6 (1973) [hereinafter HEW

REPORT]

(random sample of 20% of claims from 26 cooperating insurers in universe of 68 insurers, resulting
in data collection on 3000 files of which approximately half were used for data analysis).
17. These non-litigation variables generally include: (1) plaintiff characteristics (age, sex,
occupation, income, severity of injury, medical expenses incurred, and extent of injury): (2)
defendant characteristics (age, specialization, type of practice, educational background, and
existence of previous claim); and (3) injury characteristics (place of injury, area of practice involved,
severity of injury, and categorization of alleged negligence). GAO REPORT, supia noWe 16, at 61-73
(copy of data collection instruments used in closed claim study); HEW REPORT, s5upr note 16, at 2225 (same).
18. HEW REPORT, siipi(I note 16, at 21 (no effort was made to analyze why the claim was
dropped, so that "[t]hese data do not provide any basis for judging malpractice per se"). The GAO
Report attempted to determine whether the level of compensation in cases in which an award was
made was adequate at least in relationship to economic damages, although on this ground their
findings are admittedly speculative. GAO RE'OR'T, sipii note 16, at 44.
19. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 19 (indicating that 56.7% of all claims are terminated
without any indemnity payment to the claimant).
20. 11. DANZON, supra note 11, at 32, 42 (43% of claims terminated without payment to the
plaintiff, with almost two-thirds of these terminations occurring without litigation being filed); J.
MARDFIN, MEDICAl. MALPRACTICE IN THE STATE OF HAWAII 49, 51 (1986) (Table 7) (71% of claims
closed without payment). These results are also tentatively confirmed by our review of litigated cases
in North Carolina. At this point, we estimate that approximately 40% of litigated cases are
terminated in defendant's favor prior to trial.
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attorney. Rather, the existence of a claim is defined in terms of the insurer's
decision to open a claim file, which may include matters where there has been
little objective manifestation of the claimant's interest in pursuing his rights.2'
The GAO Report provides some further breakdown as to when these claims
close. Focusing solely on the non-payment claims, 42.7 percent were closed
without litigation ever being filed, suggesting that many were not pursued very
far or very hard.2 2 Another 41.9 percent of the non-payment cases were
closed after suit was filed but prior to trial, although there is no indication at
what stage of the litigation the suit ended or what specific procedural means,
23
if any, prompted the dismissal.
Before condemning the system that tolerates such a high level of
unsuccessful litigation, it would certainly be useful to analyze any data
offering a comparison to other types of litigation. By the same token, the
medical profession would be only modestly comforted by the fact that other
defendant classes are similarly subjected to high rates of non-prevailing
claims. In the absence of comparative data, the level of non-prevailing claims
in the malpractice area seems sufficiently high to trigger further search for
insights into the causes of as well as the procedural system's response to the

observed fact.
Do the existing empirical studies assist us in parsing through the various
explanations that might underlie pro-defendant terminations? Unfortunately,
they do not. 2-i Closed claims studies typically describe nothing more than
whether an indemnity payment was made and the general timing of
disposition. Since the data are collected from insurance company records,
there is little or no explanation from the plaintiff's perspective of what
reasons informed the dismissal. Similarly, no known attempt has been made
25
to analyze the insurer's subjective views of the merits of the litigation.

21. GAO R.i'ORT, supra note 16, at 12. For example, most insurers will open a claim file if
notified b the health care provider of an incident, regardless of whether the injured patient had
manifested an intent to assert a claim. While the GAO excluded claim files where no demand was
ever made, the claim was counted so long as any form of demand was ultimately made.
22. Id. at 82 (Table V.14) (13,544 claims terminated without payment and without suit being
filed).
23. Id. The next largest group of claims resolved without payment were those resolved after
trial. An estimated total of 1425 claims were resolved after a jury verdict (4.5%), while 253 were
terminated without payment during the pendency of the trial (0.8%). An estimated 733 claims
(2.3%) were terminated following an appeal, apparently after a trial. Another small group of claims
were terminated in favor of the defendant after being involved in some way within an arbitration
system (1456 claims, constituting 4.5%). The remaining claims were terminated by other
mechanisms not described by the GAO.
24. See Birnbaum, supra note 11, at 1006 (noting that with respect to the concern with
"frivolous'" malpractice litigation that 'available statistical data is [sicl unfortunately incomplete and
inconclusive since none of the studies undertaken have expressly focused on the problem of
unjustified medical malpractice claims").
25. Such an analysis would be possible. Insurers typically perform an investigation of the claim
after it is asserted, which may include review by one or more experts. A major purpose of this review
is to establish a reserve for insurance accounting purposes of a likely sum that may need to be paid to
the plaintiff. While the setting of reserves is not an entirely objective process, it would seem to be a
reliable means for analyzing the insurer's assessment of the case. Simply correlating the number of
cases in which the insurer established a reserve level other than $0 for claims ultimately dismissed in
favor of the defendant would provide an important insight into the possible frequency of non-
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Explaining and Understanding Non-Meritorious Litigation

Given that empirical data raise a concern, there is a need to set forth a
working hypothesis to explain the observed condition: the existence of a
significant proportion of potentially non-meritorious litigation. In light of the
different participants in the litigation process, there are any number of
possible explanations that might explain the result in a given case. The
outcome may be explained in terms of the poor information initially provided
to the plaintiff's attorney by either the client or a reviewing expert. Problems
in identifying and receiving the cooperation of truly knowledgeable experts
may prevent the plaintiff from effectively making his case. The qualifications
of the plaintiff's attorney are also directly involved. Did the error in asserting
an unsuccessful claim result from the attorney's initial misevaluation or
perhaps from the attorney's inexperience in pursuing such claims? Was the
case terminated according to plan in that new information was received
during the discovery process that reasonably changed the plaintiff's
assessment? Is there any indication that the plaintiff's attorney filed a weak
case in hopes of obtaining a coerced settlement? Alternatively, was the
inherent expense of the litigation process, exacerbated perhaps by the
defendant attorney's tactics, a major deterrent to the continued assertion of
claims? In any particular case, several of these reasons may combine. Thus, a
case may be filed only later to be dismissed because an inexperienced
plaintiff's attorney agrees to file a marginal claim, is unable to locate
sufficiently compelling experts, and then decides to drop the suit.
To a large degree, improving our understanding of the non-meritorious
litigation will require far more study of the plaintiff's side of the equation,
including a focus on both the plaintiff and the plaintiff's counsel. To date, the
bulk of the research has proceeded based upon summary data from insurers.
Such data, while certainly useful, are not likely to provide meaningful insight
into the dynamics of the case development from the plaintiff's perspective.
Most of the concerns in the area of frivolous litigation center on the plaintiff's
side of the dispute: the attorney's initial evaluation of the claim, the
continuing assessment of the merits of the case, and the process of locating
experts for analysis or presentation of the dispute. Without analyzing the
plaintiff's perspective, even if only to describe case dynamics in a
representative sample of cases, it is unlikely that a study of potentially nonmeritorious litigation could get very far.
1. Focusing on the Party Plaintiff. In attempting a deeper understanding of
the nature of malpractice claims, a useful tack would be to analyze typical
patterns of patient behavior generating malpractice claims. Is there
something about modern medical practice that causes a significant number of
non-meritorious claims? For example, we might expect a large number of
non-meritorious claims in the employment discrimination area by plaintiffs
meritorious litigation. For the best analysis to date bearing on the issue, see H.
BARGAINING: OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT IN PERSONAL. INJURY ACTIONS (1987).

GENN,

HARD
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who are poor judges of their own work. What similar dynamic may explain a
high level of false hopes in the medical context?
While there has been a growing focus on plaintiff expectations and the
litigation process, 2 6' only limited work has been performed in the malpractice
context. Existing studies establish that only a small percentage of potential
claimants ever assert a claim. 2 7 The reasons why some disgruntled patients
sue while others elect not to may suggest a possible cause of non-meritorious
claims.
A study by May and DeMarco suggests some potentially significant insights
on this point.28 A series of interviews of clients claiming to have problems
with their doctors revealed that the bulk of the problems related to technical
concerns with work performed, while doctor insensitivity was the second
major cause.2' The usual response to the problem was to find another doctor;
the second most frequent was to do nothing. Resort to an attorney was an
unusual response in that only 11.4 percent of the sample of clients with
problems consulted a lawyer. "1 Based upon the existing data, the authors of
the study were unable to draw any clear relationship between the type of
problem and the likely response to it. Indeed, even for the small percentage
of patients who consulted an attorney, there was little correlation with the
type of dispute involved. One possible observation is that personal factorssuch as the doctor's method of communicating or dealing with the patientare as important in whether the patient seeks access to the legal system as the
patient's lay assessment of whether medical negligence occurred.'
26. There is a developing body of theoretical and empirical literature bearing on why injured
parties do or do not pursue grievances. See. e.g.. K. BuMILLER, THE CiVii- RIGHTS SOCIETY: "THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988); L. FRIEDMAN, ToTALJUsTiCE (1987); A. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES T1O DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS. AND STATES (1970); Engle,
The Overbird: Song: Insiders, Outsiders and Personal Iyuries in an .American Community, 18 LAw & Soc'v
REV. 551 (1984); Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emeigence and Tiansformatio, of Disputes: Vaming, Blaming,
and Claiming. 15 LAW & Soc's REV. 631 (1981); Merry & Silbey, WI'hat do Plaintiffs ll'ant? Reexamining the
Concept of Dispute, 9JUsT. S's.J. 151 (1984); Miller & Sarat, Giez'ances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
.Adversa-v Culture. 15 LAW & Soc'v REV. 525 (1981); VidmarJustice Votives and Other Psychological Factors
in the Development and Resolution of Disputes, in THFEJUsTiCE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 395 (M. Lerner
& S. Lerner eds. 1981); Vidmar & Schuller, Individual Differences and the Pursuit of legal Rights, 11 LAW
& Hum. BEIAV. 299 (1987).
27. See CALIFORNIA MEDICAL Ass'N AND CALIFORNIA HOSPITAt ASS'N, REPORT ON TiE MEDICAl.
INSURANCE FEASIBILrr STUDY (D. Mills ed. 1977); cf Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, The Incidence of
latrogenic Injuries, in HEW REPORT, supra note 16, at 50 (extrapolating that in a given year there Would
be a total of 517 injuries caused by negligence in the hospitals involved, resulting in 31 malpractice
claims). The number of observed negligence cases and asserted claims was quite small in these
studies. Neither study provides any insight into why some of those injured choose to assert a claim.
Current research being conducted by the Harvard Medical Practice Study may shed considerable
light on the process of claiming in malpractice cases. See Hiatt, Barnes, Brennan, Laird, Lawthers,
Leape, Localio, Newhouse, Peterson, Thorpe, Weiler &Johnson, .4 Study of .ledical Injuy and .Mledical
Malpractice, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 480 (1989).
28. M. MAY & L. DEMARCO, PATIENTS AN)
WHAT TIlE' Do ABOUT THEM (1986).

DOCTORS DISPUTING:

PATIENTS,

COMPlAINTS

AND

29. Id. at Table 2 (55.6% technical failures; 30.5% insensitivity; 13.9% communication
problems).
30. Id. at Table 1.
31. Some cases probably result from the injured parties' emotional needs to cope with the grief
of major injury or death to themselves or to loved ones. See T. RANDO, GRIEF, DYING, AND )EATII:
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2. Analyzing the Role of the Plaintiff's Attorney. Another factor in
understanding the genesis of non-meritorious claims is the role of attorney
competence and expertise in the assertion and processing of claims. To date,
no research has been undertaken to analyze the effect of attorney
specialization in the area of malpractice. It has been observed that most
malpractice cases are sufficiently complex that a plaintiff has no realistic
opportunity for success without an attorney-.3 2 Beyond this observation,
however, no empirical studies have been done to analyze the effect of attorney
experience on litigation outcomes in malpractice cases. 33 As a first cut, simply
knowing the degree of specialization-especially in terms of representing
plaintiffs 34-would be important. In addition, account must be taken of the

referral practices of attorneys to assess whether inexperienced lawyers
associate with more experienced attorneys who assist in the handling of
disputesi3 Ultimately, the goal would be to analyze whether experienced
malpractice attorneys handled cases differently than those less experienced,
and the degree to which experience explains variations in outcomes.
If research studies indicated that experienced malpractice attorneys
handled cases better than their inexperienced counterparts, the consequences
could be profound."! If major inefficiencies in the litigation process-such as
the filing of non-meritorious litigation-could be traced to inexperienced
plaintiff's attorneys, several reforms are suggested. Certainly, states debating
CLINICAL INTERVENTIONS FOR CAREGIVERS (1984); K. SMITH, STAGES OF SORROW (1978). Dealing with
grief can sometimes involve taking action (such as filing a malpractice claim) or attempting to
transfer guilt (again perhaps by blaming the doctor).
32. P. DANZON, siipra note 1I, at 44. Danzon also notes that perhaps the best predictor of higher
claim frequency and severity is urbanization. Id. at 74. While partially explained by medical
specialization in urban areas, other factors are at work, including higher verdicts in urban courts.
One explanation not directly tested by Danzon is the increased ability of attorneys in urban areas to
concentrate their practice. Thus, the impact of attorney specialization is potentially of major interest.
33. For an overview of research on specialization in the legal profession generally, see 0. MARU,
RESEARCH ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A REVIEW OF WORK DONE 22-24 (2d. ed. 1986) (noting that
"there is no foundation of facts on which to build because specialization as such has not been
seriously studied").
34. The issue is primarily one relating to the representation of plaintiffs. Defense of malpractice
suits is controlled, either by way of contractual right or through practice, by insurers who regularly
employ a relatively small cadre of attorneys to defend their cases. While knowing the precise degree
of concentration on the defense side would be useful, it is likely that the bulk of attorneys on the
defense side will be experienced malpractice attorneys under any definition. The vagaries of the
process of retaining plaintiff's counsel are such, however, that there is considerable opportunity for
the novice malpractice attorney to become involved.
35. See generallv Spurr, Refen-al Practices .mong LawVers." A Theorelical and Empirical Analysis, 13 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 87 (1988) (suggesting that referral practices work efficiently to channel cases of
greater value to more qualified attorneys).
36. This is not to suggest that experience necessarily is good. An alternative hypothesis is that
the experienced malpractice lawyers may eventually seek to limit their practice to malpractice cases,
thus creating a constant need to have a set number of cases in order to keep busy. As such, given the
need to process claims, they may file claims that objectively are lacking in merit in order to keep them
and their staff working. Familiarity may also create different incentive structures which affect the
settlement dynamic. An experienced attorney, faced with a refusal by an insurer to make a
settlement offer, may feel compelled to try the case in order to maintain credibility for future
settlement negotiations, whereas an inexperienced attorney, not expecting future dealings, might
abort a weak case.
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the merits of proposals for specialization programs might find the information
useful. Educational programs designed to convey the requisite experiential
knowledge could be developed, or certification programs for malpractice
lawyers could be considered. Private marketing efforts involving claims of
specialization could be encouraged. Courts could even consider limiting
malpractice litigation to experienced lawyers or at least requiring that an
experienced lawyer be retained as co-counsel.
Given the clear benefits of analyzing the experience factor in malpractice
litigation, why have researchers ignored it? Obtaining information on
specialization in the legal profession is difficult-there is no easily accessible
and reliable list of experienced plaintiff's malpractice lawyers. Until recently,
states did not permit public claims of expertise or specialization by attorneys
in any field, despite the reality of specialization. 3 7 While some states now
sponsor certification programs in some areas,-" no state has a certification
procedure for medical malpractice expertise. Self-defined labels of expertise
continue to be prohibited by most states,3 '1 and efforts by private groups to
qualify expertise are also restricted. 41 Given this complex of legal and ethical
entanglements, a researcher is left to create an independent objective
measure of expertise, perhaps defined in terms of the number of malpractice
37. SeegenerallvJ. HEINZ & E. I,AUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: [utH SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF IHE BAR
(1982) (noting that 70% of attorneys claim to specialize).
38. The most common approach has been to have the state establish a small number of specialty
areas and then administer a credentialing process complete with testing and educational
requirements. To date, relatively few states have established such programs, and the areas of
specialization are limited and in themselves somewhat generic. For example, California's
specialization program, begun in 1971, allows attorneys to go through a rather rigid examination and
educational process in order to claim specialization in a number of areas such as criminal law, tax
law, or family law. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL, Eriics 204-05 (1988). A few states have programs
that include a specialty area for civil litigation. but none have defined a more specific category that
would include medical malpractice. Other states have adopted self-designation programs that permit
attorneys to market themselves as specializing in certain limited fields upon minimal proof of
substantial experience in the field, along with some degree of continuing education. See Davidson,
The Florida Designation PMan: 1 PIrticalApproach to Legal Specialization, 30 BAVNOR L. REv. 701 (1978).
Despite states' efforts to structure the process otherwise, numerous legal malpractice cases
suggest that there is relevant expertise in the area of handling medical malpractice claims. See. e.g.,
logstadt v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.V.2d 686 (Minn. 1980); Procanik v. Cillo, 206 N.J.
Super. 270, 502 A.2d 94 (1985), revd, 543 A.2cd 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
3
9. See ,IODEl. Rutt s OF PROFESSIONAL CONIucTr Rule 7.4 (1983) (permitting an attorney to
communicate fields of practice, but prohibiting an attorney from stating or implying that he or she is
a specialist except for patent lawyers. admiralty lawyers, or other areas designated by the particular
state).
40. See In ie Peel, 126 II1. 2d 397, 534 N.E.2d 980, cert. granted sob. noa. Peel v. Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 109 S.Ct. 3240 (1989). See generally In re Amendments to the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons ofJudicial Ethics, 276 Ark. 600, 604-05, 637 S.\N.2d
589, 592 (1982) (refusing to certify attorneys as specialists who had been so designated by the
National Board of Trial Advocacy despite the fact that the NBTA's criteria were "at least equal and
probably more stringent" than the state bar's criteria). Cf. Johnson v. Director of Professional
Responsibility, 341 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1983) (permitting attorney to use certification by National
Board of Frial Advocacy as a "Civil Trial Specialist" owing to the state's failure to promuigate rules
to implement its own specialization system). Thus, the situation is quite unlike the extensive private
credentialing process in medicine. See Havighurst & King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Persotnel:
.An Antitrust Perspective, (Part One). 9 Ami. J. L. & MED. 13 , 138-150 (1983).
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claims or cases handled over a certain period of time, a difficult statistic to
obtain.
C.

The Responsiveness of the Litigation System in Identifying and
Dispensing with Non-Meritorious Litigation

Focusing on the reasons why some patients sue and the role of attorneys in
the process would provide important insights into the question of nonmeritorious litigation. In addition, there is a need to focus substantial
research energies on the responsiveness of the procedural system itself. The
concern with non-meritorious litigation is not simply its existence or its
causes, but how the system responds to it. As already mentioned, no system
can be designed that would preclude the assertion of non-meritorious claims.
The litigation system anticipates non-meritorious litigation and provides
procedural devices to terminate such cases. Indeed, several procedural
devices are potentially involved in stemming the tide. In an era increasingly
dominated by a sanctions mentality, attempting to identify and punish
inappropriate behavior by plaintiffs or their attorneys for filing frivolous suits
is a potential procedural response. 4 1 Nonetheless, the most significant
procedural means available to handle non-meritorious litigation is probably
the motion for summary judgment. In the medical malpractice context,
attention must also be focused on the performance of the screening panel
procedures in identifying non-meritorious cases.
1. Evaluating the Utility of Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is a wellrecognized procedural tool that has been available, essentially in its present
form, for an extensive period of time. Empirical research on summary
judgment is limited, but suggests that relatively few cases are terminated by

41. It is interesting to note that a significant portion of the recent development of state
procedural law concerning sanctions and frivolous litigation, including developments in the tort of
malicious prosecution, has occurred in the medical malpractice context. See generally Birnbaum, snpra
note 11, at 1077-89. Cf S. LAs & S. POI.AN, PAIN AND PRoFIr: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 86, 267

n.86 (1978) (noting that numerous state medical societies assisted in financing countersuits against
plaintiff's attorneys). Recently, a jury in Georgia awarded a doctor $135,000 for being the victim of
malicious litigation tinder the doctrine enunciated in Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92, 344 S.E.2d 414
(1986). See Fuhlton County Daily Report, Dec. 16, 1988, at 2.
Many states, following the lead of the federal courts, have adopted a revised version of Rule II
which now requires an attorney to have an objective basis for asserting a position in any paper filed in
court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Empirical research on Rule 11, which was amended in 1983, is still in
its infancy. See KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE II SANCTIONS (1985). The adoption of state
counterparts to Rule II is even more recent; in North Carolina, for example, the amended Rule I I
was effective only as ofJanuary 1,1987. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 11 (1988). Given how recently
the change has taken place in most states, it would not yet be productive to analyze the impact of the
amended rule on the assertion of malpractice claims.
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the process, 4 2 although the rate at which summary judgment motions are filed
4 3"
and granted varies considerably among different case types.
A profile of the use of summary judgment in malpractice cases would be
useful. 4 4 An adequate profile would include a breakdown of the different
purposes that a summary judgment motion could address. Some motions, for
example, seek only to extricate a peripheral defendant in a multi-defendant
suit. Other motions raise legal challenges. Perhaps the most significant
motions, however, are those that seek to challenge the assertion of negligence
on the part of all or at least the primary defendants in the case. Knowing the
success rate for summary judgment motions across the board would not be
nearly as valuable as knowing the results within these different categories.
Beyond mere description, however, empirical research could contribute to
a more refined understanding of the role of the summary judgment process.
Existing studies confirm that a significant proportion of summary judgment
motions are never acted on by the court. 45 Explaining the impact of these
non-decisions in response to the motions is vital. It may be that the filing of
the motion itself serves to convince plaintiffs to dismiss their case;
42. The most recent empirical study indicates that approximately 6% of federal court cases are
terminated pursuant to grant of a summary judgment motion. J. CECIL & C. DOUGLAS, SUMMARY
JUDGMENT PRACTICE IN THREE DISTRICT COURTS (1987). See McLauchlan, An Empirical S/tidy of the
Federal Summai ndgmeni Rule. 6J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 449-54 (1977) (review of filings in one district
court indicated that summary judgment motions were filed in only 4.0% of all cases, resulting in
disposition in 2.3% of total filings).
These studies are descriptive, and do not purport to assess whether sunnary judgment provides
an adequate filter for non-meritorious cases. The study by Cecil and Douglas, for example, involved
a review of approximately 200 terminated cases in each of three different federal district courts. j.
CECIL & C. DoUcGt.AS, supra, at 3. Given the nature of the federal court docket, few, if any, malpractice
cases were involved.
43. Cecil and Douglas indicated that summary judgments were routinely filed in social secturity
cases, owing to the administrative proceeding occurring prior to the filing of the lawsuit. J. CECIL &
C. DOUGLAS, s.upta note 42, at 3-4. Summary judgments were filed in 30% and 20%o respectively of
the civil rights and prisoner cases in the sample. Id. at 7. These high numbers tend to confirm the
perception that the potential for non-meritorious cases in these litigation contexts is high. In
personal injury actions, summary judgments were filed in only 11% of the cases. Id.
44. One of the few detailed discussions of the use of snmnary judgment in medical malpraciice
cases is found in Brunet, The Use and .isnse of Expert 7esting in StinittarvJndgnent. 22 U.C. DAvis L. RiV.
93 (1988). One study provides a glimpse into the frequency of use of summary judgment in
malpractice cases. The National Center for State Courts' review of Arizona's screening panel
collected some background data on the court system. In the year prior to the introduction of the
screening panel, 18 out of 139 malpractice cases (13%) were terminated by a grant of summary
judgment. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, MEDICAL LIABILITY REVIEW PANEIS IN ARIZONA: AN
EVALUATION 13 (1980).
No data are presented on how often the parties moved for summary
judgment or other dispositions. Preliminary data from our research suggest that in North Carolina
the rate of filing in malpractice cases is relatively high, with such motions being filed in over onequarter of all cases. The overwhelming percentage are filed by defendants. The data indicate that
filing of the motion is often effective in terminating the dispute. While only a modest proportion are
granted outright, in a significant percentage of cases the filing of the motion serves as an impetus to
the plaintiff"to dismiss its case. Of course, success is a relative term and must be assessed in terms of
how long it took to obtain the dismissal of the case, the cost, and the appropriateness of the final
disposition.
45. According to Cecil and Douglas, 34% of all summaryjudgment motions in the federal court
sample were never acted upon. J. CECIL & C. DOUGLAS, stupta note 42, at 6. While not providing a
relative breakdown, the report notes that the non-decisions represented either settlements following
the filing of the motion or dismissals by the plaintiff.
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alternatively, the filing of the motion could spur meaningful settlement
negotiations by encouraging a recalcitrant plaintiff or defendant to return to
the bargaining table with more realistic expectations. Even if only a small
proportion of summary judgment motions were granted, the existence of the
procedure could nonetheless serve as a useful adjunct to either the settlement
process or the existing mechanisms for the removal of non-meritorious cases,
apart from any direct judicial involvement.
2. The Screening Panel and Non-Meritorious Litigation. The potentiality of
procedural mechanisms to identify non-meritorious litigation can also be
assessed by reviewing the performance of specialized panels created in
numerous states in the mid-1970's to review malpractice claims prior to
litigation. 4 The panels operated differently among the various states, 4 7 but
they typically required plaintiffs to submit their claims to a panel consisting of
three members, at least one of whom would be a doctor. The panel would
evaluate the evidence and issue a determination as to whether the claim had
merit, and, in some states, suggest a damages award if liability were found.
One of the panel's primary purposes was to identify frivolous cases at an
early stage in the process. 4 Theoretically, a determination of "no liability"
46.

Some form or variety of screening panel was enacted in over 30 states. See HUMAN
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: No AGREEMENT ON TIHE
PROBLEMS OR SOLUTIONS 133-39 (1986).
47. The screening panels in the states that have implemented them differ in important respects.
including: (1)whether the procedure is mandatory or voluntary; (2) whether screening must precede
the filing of the suit;
(3) whether the panels are empowered to make an award of damages; (4) the
number of panel members to hear a case; (5) the qualifications of panel members; (6) the selection
mechanism for panel members; (7) use of experts; (8) use of the panel's determination in subsequent
litigation; and (9) the formality of' the hearing itself. See P. EBENER, Supra note 7, at 56-68. It is
important to take cognizance of these many differences because they limit one's ability to generalize
an individual state's performance with a particular screening panel procedure to the collective whole.
It is also important to note that screening panels are usually adopted as part of a package of
substantive reforms intended to address perceived problems in malpractice litigation. These other
contemporaneous changes in the legal system also serve to complicate any analysis of the screening
panel's impact on the litigation system due to the confounding effects of these other changes.
48. See. e.g., I)aughtrev & Smith, Medical Malpractice Review Panels ii Operation iii i-gima, 19 U.
RiCi. L. REV. 273, 275 (1985) ("lal major goal of the legislation is to help contain the cost of
medical malpractice insurance by encouraging . . . abandonments of non-meritorious claims").
Screening panels were also intended to achieve other goals including earl' settlements of
meritorious claims. See info text accompanying notes 72-80. The panels also were intended to speed
the disposition of claims. Unburdened by docket demands created by other cases and by the ability
to proceed informally, they could process claims more efficiently, with an attendant reduction in
transaction costs. This latter purpose was clearly not achieved in all cases. See, e.g., Mattos v.
Tlhompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (declaring screening panel provision unconstitutional
due to the delay, often as long as four years, in having a hearing scheduled); Howard, An Evaluation of
Medical Liabiliv Review Panels in AriZona, STATE CT.J., Spring 1981, at 19 (noting delay with appointing
and convening malpractice panels in Arizona).
In addition, it was intended that the panels would lower expenses. The evidence on this point is
mixed. Frank Sloan reviewed insurance premium information and attempted to correlate changes in
premium rates for malpractice insurance over the period 1974-78 with a number of different tort
reform proposals enacted by the particular states. One variable was the existence or non-existence of
a screening panel procedure. While not attempting to assess the performance of screening panels,
the analysis noted that over this particular period of time, there was a statistically significant
correlation between the existence of screening panels and a reduction in premiums; indeed, this was
the only variable that consistently correlated with a reduction in premiums. Nonetheless, Sloan
RESOURCES Div.,
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would discourage pursuit of the claim. What impact have the screening
panels had, or put differently, what insights into the existence or handling of
frivolous litigation has the screening panel experience provided? The studies
have established that in a high percentage of cases, findings of "no liability"
4t
by the panel result in the claim being dropped without litigation being filed. 9
Some of these studies have taken this fact and concluded-rather cavalierly at
best-that screening panels have worked to screen out frivolous claims.

5t

Absent comparative insight into whether these claims would in fact have been
asserted in court in the absence of a panel procedure, the conclusions drawn
are questionable. None of the studies discussed in the report involved
prepanel baseline data against which panel performance could be assessed;
nor did the studies control for other variables that could explain observed
outcomes. Citing high disposition rates without significant subsequent
litigation ignores the fact that the panel system may identify claims that would
otherwise never come to the attention of medical insurers or the legal system,
absent the mechanism itself. The screening panel may well have encouraged
parties to abandon any private screening (usually by plaintiff's lawyers) in
favor of the free screening provided by the panel. Moreover, even in the
absence of screening panels, a significant percentage of litigated cases are
dropped with minimal expense to the defendant. Without a comparative
assessment of costs or other relevant concerns, there may be no reason to
prefer screening panels. Finally, there remains the fundamental question
whether the panel determinations are correct. Recent evidence from Hawaii
indicates that a number of claims involving "no liability" findings by the panel
5
are in fact pursued by plaintiffs to a successful end. '
A series of studies of the Arizona screening pane 5 2 represent the only
research to date with a methodological design adequate to permit meaningful
points out ,that there is reason to quest ion the long-run impact of' screening panels on premiums,
given the potential for added expense in cases that do not require further proceedings, as well as the
possible encouragement of more claims owing to the existence of the informal procedure. Sloan,
Stale Responoes to the .Malpacticelisurance "Crisis "of the 1970s .n EmpiricalAssessmet, 9,J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 629, 636, 640-43 (1985).
49. The major work here is a compilation of early returns from numertus state scircening panels
prepared by the Intergovernmental Health Project in 1980. This report noted that panels had
achieved significant records of promoting carly terminations in numerous states. P. CARLIN,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PRE-TRIAL SCRFFNING PANELS: A REVIEW OF" THE EViDENCE 30-32 (1980)
(noting both high level of findings in favor of defendant physicians and low rate of subsequent
litigation). Other studies make the same point for individual states' experiences. See, e.g.. Daughtrev
& Smith, snpra note 48, at 289 (noting that more than two-thirds of claimants did not pursue claim
following screening panel's finding of non-liability).
50. See P. CARLIN. sipra note 49, at 30 ("high correlation between a panel's decision and the final
disposition of the case may indicate, at least in some of the states, that screening panels are
effectively weeding out a number of unjustified claims"); Dance, Medical Valpractice: Preliligation
Screening Panels in Idaho, 19 IDAHO L. RE%'. 31, 45 (1983) (system is "successful and worthwhile"
because, based on a survey of law firms, only 26%7o of cases found to be "without merit" were later
filed in court, thus suggesting that lawsuits wsere kept from being filed in the remaining 74% of cases
"without merit").
51. See iiifra
text accompanying notes 75-78.
52. The Arizona experience was initially evaluated by the National Center for State Courts.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, upra note 44. Their findings are summarized in Howard, stpa
note 48. See also Note. .4PracticalAssessent of..lrizona : .Medical .MalpracticeScreening Svsteni. 1984 ARIZ.
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analysis of the panel's performance. Data were collected on malpractice
claims before and after implementation of the panel system in 1976. The data
included information from two major malpractice insurers regarding
expenses charged to various files, which consisted primarily of outside
counsel legal fees. These data serve as a useful proxy for litigation costs to
defendants, a potentially important factor in assessing any litigation system's
handling of non-meritorious litigation.
The data produced a number of interesting findings relating to an
understanding of frivolous litigation. The panels had no significant effect on
the proportion of cases that involved indemnity payments or on the amount of
indemnity payments. Claim frequency, however, increased significantly-a
rather disturbing finding given the goals of reducing litigation by removing
5
non-meritorious cases. 3
The authors of the study hypothesized that one of the reasons that more
cases were coming into the system was that plaintiffs who previously would
have been deterred by private screening and discovery costs could now afford
to pursue claims under the panel system. This does not necessarily mean that
more cases are being encouraged; it could mean only that they have become
visible under the panel system. Further, to the extent that this alternative
hypothesis is true, it might affect the conclusion that there was no significant
effect on the proportion of indemnity payments: Indeed, the proportion
could be lower if the panels are screening more non-meritorious cases than
would have entered the system.
In sum, empirical researchers face a major challenge in both identifying
the extent of potentially non-meritorious litigation and describing how the
litigation system has reacted to it. While additional research initiatives could
shed much-needed light on the existence of the problem and perhaps suggest
some solutions, the challenge of quantifying the number of non-meritorious
claims remains. The problem of piercing through the fog generated by
incomplete information from a variety of sources may well prevent the
researcher from ever being able to isolate the hopeless case, leaving us to
study the issue through indirect means.
III
THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS

Existing empirical work has sounded one clear note: As with other types
of litigation, voluntary settlements 54 constitute the predominant method of
resolving malpractice cases. As many as 90 percent of the claims in which
S,. L.J. 335. Shmanske and Stevens prepared a further analysis drawing upon the existing data base.
Shmanske & Stevens, lhe Petfoimance of.lledical .llwapacice Review Panels. I IJ. HEAL-1i- Pot.. POL'Y & L.
525 (1986).
53. See Shmanske & Stevens, supra note 52, at 529-33.
54. As used in this article, a settlement is a voluntary resolution in which the defendant agrees to
make a payment to the plaintiff in return for dismissing the claim. The term is occasionally used
more b)oadly to rcle to the resolution of the dispute by any means and regardless of whether the
plailtuill received any compensation.

See GAO REPotRlT, spno note 16, app. V at 82 (Table V.14)
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payment is made to the plaintiff are resolved without an adjudicative
proceeding, that is, without arbitration or trial. 5 5 This fact alone justifies
significant research into typical settlement patterns. Unless one understands
the dynamics by which most disputes are removed from the system, one
cannot fully assess its workings when it does in fact determine the merits of a
case; an aberrant trial result may be tempered by evidence of an efficient
extra-judicial system.
Ironically, the settlement process has not often served as a focal point of
criticism among malpractice observers. If the current system is bad, the
settlement process must be at least partially at fault given its tremendous level
of involvement. The lack of direct criticism reflects the fact that settlement,
occurring outside the public eye, is not well understood. By the same token,
however, many of the criticisms directed elsewhere have settlement
applications. Concerns with biased juries, high transaction costs, and the
existence of large amounts of frivolous litigation combine to suggest that the
prevailing procedures may coerce defendants to settle weak cases or pay more
than the fair amount in meritorious cases given the expense and risks
associated with attempting vindication. Moreover, even in those cases in
which reasonable settlements are obtained, it may be that it took too long or
cost too much to resolve the dispute. 5 Accordingly, a focused criticism of the
settlement process in malpractice cases would include concern with what
57
Galanter has recently called the "quality" of settlements.
A.

The Interaction between Litigation Procedures and the Settlement
Process

We know little about the settlement process in malpractice cases.
Acknowledging the overwhelming fact that many settlements occur is hardly
descriptive of the process. Empirical research, consisting primarily of closed
claims studies, provides only general guidance as to when cases settle or what
events tend to trigger voluntary agreement. 5 1 By far the largest category of
settlements-approximately 60 percent of the total cases settled-occur after
(reference to the universe of possible dispositions as "settlement stages" so that a trial or arbitration
would be considered a selllenien stage).
55. According to the recent GAO Report. terminations in the plaintiff's favor (with a pay'ment)
occurred in 24,630 claims at the following stages: (1) prior to the filing of a lawsuit (7562 claims or
30.7% of' all claims closed with a payment); (2) after filing of the suit but before trial (15,252 or
61.9%); (3) during trial (585 or 2.4%); (4) after trial is completed (331 claims or 1.3%); (5) after
appeal (277 claims or 1.1%); (6) as part of the arbitration process (370 claims or 1.5%); and (7) other
scenarios (253 claims or 1.0%). GAO REPOrT, stpra note 16, app. V at 82 (Table V.14). [he first
two categories-the non-trial settlements-total approximately 93% of all plaintiff recoveries. See
HEW REPORT, sipra note 16, at 14 ([able 2 showing that plaintiff obtained some recovery in 40.0%
of the cases, and of this group, 90.3% of the settlements were resolved prior to trial).
56. This point reflects the general concern with the ad hoc process by which settlements are
usually obtained. See W. BRAZIL, SE iING Cix L Surs 44 (1985) (process of obtaining settlement is
"awkward, expensive, time-consuming, and stressful").
57. Galanter, The Qualitv of Settlements. 1988 No.J. Dis. RESOLUTION 55.
58. Some limited eflorts have been made to model the negotiating process through the use of
econometric models. See 1. 1)ANZON & l. LiA.I.ARD, -I'1E RESO.UTION OF NMEDICA. MALPRACTICE
CLmMS: MODELING THE BARGAINING PROCESS (1983).
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litigation is filed but before trial. 5 -9 Some of these cases settle soon after the
case is filed, while others practically settle on the courthouse steps as the trial
is about to start. Closed claims studies are content to lump these potentially
disparate situations into a single category. But the differences between them
in terms of expense to the parties and often to the judicial system, the
information upon which the settlement was based, the reasons for accepting
the settlement, and how the agreement was negotiated, are potentially quite
significant.
A contribution to our understanding of settlement could be made simply
by describing the timing of settlements with greater precision. The mass of
pretrial settlements needs to be broken down into meaningful subsets. One
approach would be to focus more descriptive energies on the chronologies of
cases, from the time of filing the complaint to the date of settlement. A more
refined approach would relate the settlement to the procedural status of a
case. Many of the procedural rules available within the litigation process have
the potential to shape or affect settlement. For example, the filing of a
summary judgment motion by the defendant, even if not likely to be granted,
serves to impose costs on the plaintiff which may well affect settlement
decisions. Other procedural matters-such as whether to bifurcate the issue
of damages and liability or sever a defendant for a separate trial-materially
affect the dynamics of the settlement process. An attempt to correlate
settlement patterns with procedural events would enhance our understanding
of the relationship of the procedural system to the settlement process.
This point can be illustrated by considering the potential relationship
between settlement and the discovery process. How many cases settle with
only minimal use of the discovery tools available? Put differently, to what
degree are settlements driven by specific events occurring during discovery or
in conjunction with the discovery process? Likely candidates for empirical
scrutiny include the influences of the depositions of key individuals (the
defendant, the plaintiff, and the parties' respective expert witnesses), or
judicial rulings on discovery motions. For example, if the parties are seldom
in a position to assess settlement of the case until such time as the opposing
parties' trial experts are scrutinized, this fact will have significant ramifications
for efforts to streamline the process.
B.

The Quality of Settlements in Malpractice Cases

As a second major area of research opportunity, there is a need to explore
the quality of malpractice settlements in greater detail. Particularly,
researchers must go behind the fact of settlement to analyze the positions and
justifications offered by the respective parties to determine the applicable
range of normative concerns.al Negotiation is often justified as the preferred
means of resolving disputes because it permits the litigants to resort to a
59.
60.

GAO REPORT, supra note 16, app. V at 82.

Galanter. supa note 57, at 75-78.
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broader spectrum of norms. 6 ' Yet it is likely that the negotiating environment
differs significantly among dispute contexts. While there is some evidence
that mechanistic settlement rules develop in routine cases, 62 results in more
complex disputes are more a product of the attorneys' skills across a range of
The ultimate challenge of empirical research on the litigation
factors.'
dynamic in malpractice cases may well be in describing the operative norms of
the negotiating environment.
The negotiating environment could be profitably explored in connection
with an analysis of the substantial number of claims settled without a lawsuit
being filed at all. A full third of claims in which the plaintiff receives

64
The existence of
compensation are settled without a lawsuit being filed.

such a large cohort of disputes being resolved expeditiously without any
direct judicial involvement is at least curious. To understand the potential
importance of these pre-litigation settlements, we must start by describing the
nature of the claims-in terms of complexity, factual issues presented, and
damages claimed-and compare this profile to the claims that are litigated.
Two opposing scenarios are suggested. In the first, the insurer may simply be
settling the smaller cases-those where a few thousand dollars will placate the
plaintiff without involving defense attorneys at all. This appears to be the
prevailing assumption and has empirical support at least for insurers'
settlement practices in the 1970's. 65 Alternatively, insurers may be seeking to
minimize risk and reduce transaction costs in the most serious malpractice
disputes.
A key parameter to measure would be the insurer's own assessment of
liability, including a description of how that assessment was reached. In cases
of clear liability where the plaintiff is willing to accept something close to
actual economic damages, it would appear to be in an insurer's interest to
settle early to avoid the cost of defense. The more interesting scenario is the
case with questionable liability. Are insurers and plaintiffs in such cases able
to reach a compromise without the formalities of the litigation process?
Without the coercive powers of the discovery system, access to information
needed to evaluate the case depends upon voluntary agreement. Do the
61. Eisenberg, Pinale Oideing Through Negolialion: Dispnie Settlement and Rulemaking. 89 1-,AR',. L.
REV. 637 (1976).
62. Galanter, supia note 57. at 77-78 (citing H. Ross. SE-rri.J OUT OF COURT: I'tE SOCIAL
PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAi,\is

ADJUSTMENTS (1970)).

63. Galanter, supra note 57, at 77 (citing Agent Orange case and Buffalo Creek disaster as
evidencing substitution of payment of money for mutual assessment of responsibility, causation,
relative blame, or other potentially more normative measures). See H. GP-NN. sipra note 25.
64. Of the 22,814 claims settled without any formal adjudication. 7562 or 33.1% were settled
without litigation being filed. GAO REPORr, supra note 16, app. V at 82 (Table V.14).
65. The usually unspoken assumption is that the smaller, less significant cases are settled
without litigation. See HEW REPORT, stpra note 16, at 14 (Table 3 showing that all pre-litigation
settlements were for less than $20,000). A compilation of data from Four closed claims studies in the
1970's revealed that approximately 90% of all compensation paid in malpractice cases was paid in
litigated cases. This percentage exceeded an estimated 77% iate for payment in litigated cases in
general liability cases and 337 in automobile cases. J. K..\KALi.K & N. PACE, supra note 10, at 31 (Table
3.3).
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insurers and plaintiffs in fact substitute informal discovery procedures or
instead simply act upon imperfect information? Put differently, is the plaintiff
(who typically has a greater need to access information) in a position to obtain
the information necessary to assess the potential merits of the case?
Another potentially important variable is the experience level of the
attorney representing the claimant. It may be that experienced lawyers have
greater credibility with insurers and are thus more often able to settle a claim
without resorting to litigation. Alternatively, it may be that inexperienced
lawyers are more likely to settle at this earlier stage owing to an inability to
present the claim well or ignorance of the appropriate "going rate" for a
particular type of claim. One's view of the ultimate desirability of early
settlements may well depend on which of these descriptions is more accurate.
Another critical qualitative factor is the manner in which expert evidence is
used in settlements. In litigation, obtaining experts, discovering information
about the other side's experts, and evaluating their opinions represent a
critical and often contentious stage of the lawsuit. When this litigation reality
is transposed to the pretrial process, it must play quite differently. Indeed,
one should start by asking whether expert input is in fact even obtained in a
significant proportion of claims. If it is obtained, a subsequent question
concerns the degree to which the typically adversarial nature of the exchange
is affected. Knowing more about how the parties either avoid this reliance on
experts or else streamline it to suit the more informal negotiation process
would be valuable.('
C.

Structuring the Settlement Process: The ADR Example

Describing the process of settlement and assessing the qualitative nature
of the settlement dynamic in the malpractice context would permit
researchers to consider what procedural reforms might improve the
settlement process. An analysis of obstacles to settlement that may exist in
cases is important here. From existing research, we have little basis for
assessing what constitutes the primary barriers to settlement-the defendant
doctor seeking vindication, the recalcitrant plaintiff wanting a public
humiliation of the doctor, the plaintiff's attorney looking for a larger fee, the
insurer willing to run some risks to avoid paying money promptly, or the
defense lawyer seeking to extend the hours to increase a fee? The
identification of critical factors or procedural concerns in the settlement
process may suggest many reforms. For example, we have seen a continued
7
evolution of a judiciary actively involved in promoting settlements.6
66. Researching these issues in the pre-litigation area will not be easy, and will require the
cooperation of the insurance industry since public records are usually non-existent. To take
advantage of the opportunity fully, careful review of a significant number of individual files will be
necessary since summary data will not permit analysis of many of the concerns raised above.
Moreover, it would be preferable to include several different insurers in order to assess the variability
of' settlement practices among companies.
67. The literature on judicial involvement is extensive. See, e.g.. Will, Merhige & Rubin, Die Role
of the Judge in Ihe Se/ileme,,I Proress. 75 F.R.I). 203 (1977); W. BRAZIL. supra note 56.
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Improved information on the settlement process could provide activist judges
with ideas as to how to structure discovery or focus negotiating issues.
Similarly, any proposed further reform of the procedural system would
benefit from this analysis." 8
Perhaps the most significant potential use of improved empirical research
on the settlement process would be in the development of alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") procedures for malpractice cases. Several groups or
commentators have recently urged that ADR methods be used in malpractice
cases at least on an experimental basis. 't While ADR is a somewhat
amorphous concept, 7ti clearly one of its principal purposes is to improve the
settlement process by either: (1) encouraging early and hopefully cheaper
settlements; (2) settling presently unsettlable cases; or (3) improving the
quality of the voluntary resolutions. 7 ' In analyzing the performance of any
ADR plan, the empirical issue can be defined in settlement terms: How useful
is the alternative with respect to assisting the parties to evaluate cases as
compared to the existing litigation process, and more particularly as
compared to the method by which claims are currently being settled?
68. One suggested approach focuses upon a significant change in the dynamics of the settlement
process. The proposal creates a strong incentive for doctors and hospitals to settle disputes early by
providing that the potential malpractice defendant could offer to pay the injured patient's economic
losses. lin turn, the patient would give up any right to non-econoinic damages, that is, pain and
suffering. See Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical .llalpioctice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic
Loss, 44 LA. L. REv. 1267 (1984). A bill providing for such a systelm was introduced during the 99th
Congress (the Moore-Gephardt proposal). H.R. 3084, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). In some
respects. this proposal is a radical variation of the efforts to provide for an "offer of settlement"
within the established rules of civil procedure to provide the parties some clear incentives to settle.
69. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRA\CTICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 3031 (1987) (noting desirability of evaluating alternative dispute resolution mechanisms); SPECIAL TASK
FORCE ON PIROFESSIONAL IIABIIiTY, AMA, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THiE 80's: REPORTi No. 3, at 6-7
(1985) (discussion of alternatives to litigation); id. at 13-14 (recommendations relating to
improvements in the liability resolution system including expanded use of pretrial screening panels
and sanctions for filing frivolous litigation, and consideration of use of specific ADR forms such as
couri-ordered arbitration); Note, Healh Care Provides and .ller1/aive Dispute Resoluion: .Veeded .Medicine
lo Combat Medical Malpractice Claims, 4 J. DisP. RESOtLUrTION 65 (1988) (focusing on use of screening
panels and arbitration). See NI. CARBINE, HEALTH CARE AND TIE LAW: DEVEi.OPING FLE XIBLE DISPUTE
RESOLUTrioN MECHANISMS FOR TiE HEATH CARE FiELo (1988); Nelson, Medical Malpractice ond
Al/ernative Dispute Resolu/ion, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 345 (1986). [here have been regular and
repeated calls among those in the medical profession to expand the use of arbitration. See, e.g.,
Powsner & Hamermesh, Medical .Malpractice Crisis the Second Time ..lroririd. lliy .Vo/ .-Irbiirate?,8,J. LEGAL
IED. 238 (1987).
70. As commonly used in this literature, 'alternatives to litigation" covers a disparate collection
of concepts. Thus, the term is defined broadly enough to include the use of non-negligence-based
compensation systems such as no-fault systems, the creation ofdesignated compensable events," or
the formal restr uctturing of tort law requirements through private contractual arrangements. See
HHS REPORT, supro note 6, at 136-44. See generallv Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort Law Dogma:
Morket Opportun/ies and Legal Obstacles. LAw & CoNiEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 143. As used in this
article, I am limiting the phrase alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to its procedural
manifestations, such as mediation, arbitration, or any of the various specific forms including courtannexed arbitration, mini-trials, summary jury trials, or the screening panel procedure.
7 1. See, e.g.. Lieberman & Henry, Lessoisfroi the.llertrative Disp//e Resolulion .1lovemeri/, 53 U. Ct.
I. Riv. 424, 427 (1986) ('A1)R premised upon hypothesis that . . . they could voluntarily reach a
Sriclhmincit as just as thie result a court would impose"); Edwards, Alterna/ive Dispute Resolutiori: Panacea
,,, IwIrhrm, 99 1IARV. .. Riv. 668, 673 (1985) (noting the "enormous settlement-enhancing
j,,,wj,.
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1. Assessing Existing ADR Programs as Settlement Devices: The Screening Panel
Experience. To date, the use of alternative processes in malpractice cases has
centered on two different techniques: arbitration 72 and the screening panel
procedure discussed above. The screening panel procedures, while primarily
intended to deter frivolous litigation, are justified in part by the hope that the
parties in meritorious cases will be able to use a panel's finding of liability and
assessment of an appropriate compensation as a basis upon which to resolve
the dispute without litigation. In order to benefit the settlement process, the
parties and their attorneys must give significant weight to the panel's finding
respecting liability, and, where authorized, the quantum of damages. In
short, the settlement enhancing rationale can be cited only if the early
intervention provides an evaluation that may establish a meaningful basis for
7
settlement. 3
Most research on screening panels is descriptive in that it focuses primarily
on numbers of hearings held or disposition times. The research focuses
indirectly on its impact on settlement due largely to the lack of a comparison
74
data base on litigation against which to compare the panel's performance.
Nonetheless, the limited empirical research that does exist raises significant
questions about the potential utility of the procedure as an aid to the
settlement process.

72. Arbitration is perhaps the most frequently mentioned ADR option for malpractice cases.
Despite the attention that it has received, arbitration to date has been a minor factor in litigating
malpractice cases. According to the reported results, the GAO found that less than 2000 claims out
of its entire projected claim total of 56,000 were terminated either after arbitration or in anticipation
of an arbitration proceeding. GAO REPORT, spra note 16, at 82 (Table V.14). While several modest
empirical studies of arbitration have been conducted, none have attempted a comprehensive analysis
of whether arbitration has affected the results in cases or what cost savings, if any, have been realized.
For example, based upon a review of 36 arbitrated malpractice cases, a committee empowered to
review Michigan's arbitration program concluded that arbitration "was characterized by a shorter
time from filing to disposition, lower expenses for defense of claims and more consistent awards."
Memorandum from Rhonda N. Powsner to Saul Boyarskev, cited in Terry, The Tec/inical and Conceptual
Flaws of Medical .Mlalpractice Arbitiation. 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 571, 573 n. II (1986). This conclusion,
apparently based upon a comparison with litigated cases going to trial, is open to serious question
owing to possible differences in the character of cases involved.
Arbitration is intended primarily as a more efficient, cheaper, consistency-oriented means of
reaching a binding decision; impacts on settlement are secondary. See Heiz, . rbitration of Iedical
.Malpractice Claims: Is it Cost Effective?, 36 MD. L. REV. 533, 534-35, 548 (1977) (noting principal goals
of arbitration to include speedy handling of cases, time savings for physicians, improved
sophistication of decisionmaker, "more realistic awards," reduced discovery costs, and privacy of
forum, but noting that arbitration as a practical matter results in settlement of cases). The primary
impact on settlement would seem to come from the mere fact of scheduling an arbitration hearing in
that it forces the attorneys to prepare and analyze their cases. Since such preparation can occur more
quickly in an arbitration setting, earlier settlements may result. There would not appear to be any
intended impact on the quality of settlements, except perhaps for a possible across-the-board
reduction in dollar values of settlements given the lack of recourse to a jury. No empirical research
to date has focused on the impact of arbitration on the settlement process.
73. The screening panel is typically justified in terms of' both ferreting out non-meritorious
litigation and assisting in prompt settlements of meritorious suits. See. e.g., P. DANZON, supra note 1i,
at 198; Daughtrey & Smith, supra note 48, at 275.
74. See P. DANZON, supa note II, at 200. For typical examples of the descriptive research
performed on screening panels, see l)aughtrey & Smith, snpra note 48.
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Recent data from Hawaii are illustrative. There, researchers tracked 453
screening panel decisions over a five-year period from 1979 to 1984.75 In 109
cases (or 24 percent of the total), the panel made a finding of liability.
According to theory, these are the cases in which the parties should reach
settlements earlier than in the past using the panel's determination as a basis
of accord. According to the research, eighteen of these cases (16 percent of
the universe of liability cases) in fact settled without the need for formal
litigation. In almost half of the cases (fifty-three in total), the researchers
report that the claimant took no further action, while in the balance (thirty7y Of the
seven cases, constituting 34 percent) the claimants filed a lawsuit.
litigated cases, nineteen were settled (many for relatively small amounts), four
went to trial (with the defendant somewhat surprisingly winning three of the
cases), one was dismissed, and eight were pending as of the time the report
was prepared.
The Hawaii study is particularly interesting because it is the only study that
has information comparing the actual litigation result with the panel's
suggested compensation level. 7 7 While the number of cases in the sample is
very small, the data are nonetheless revealing. The Hawaii study identified
seventeen claims in which the panel found liability and made a determination
of an appropriate compensation level, and the case subsequently settled for a
known amount. The panel's liability awards in these cases ranged from $250
to $750,000. The ultimate dispositions varied significantly: Four claims
settled for the same amount, and three for less, while ten settled for more
than the panel's recommendation. No explanation is given as to the
variances; the researchers concluded that the "final award of settlement figure

' ' 78
varied widely from the recommended amount.
Perhaps even more interesting are the results from the cases in which the
panel found no liability on the part of the doctor. In the sample group

consisting of 453 hearings, "no liability" findings were made in 328 cases (72
percent). To be sure, the data suggest that for many of the cases, comprising
approximately 70 percent of the "no liability" findings, the panel's decision
ended the dispute. This phenomenon suggests that the panel is assisting in
one primary function-the screening of non-meritorious claims. Yet, other

data urge caution even in this respect, and specifically call into question the
panel's function in aiding the settlement process. Despite the screening
panel's findings, litigation was initiated in seventy-eight "no liability" cases

(24 percent of the total). Dispositions were known for fifty-one of these cases.
Significantly, despite the finding of no liability, thirty of these cases (or almost
60. percent) were resolved with a payment to the plaintiff. While many
75.
76.

J. MARDFIN, supra note 20, at 13.
Id. at 15.

77. There are two reasons for the paucity of comparative data. First, since most panels were
created in the mid- to late 1970's, insufficient time has passed to collect such data. Second, only a
minority of states using mandatory screening panels permit the panel to make a specific finding on
damages. See P. EBENER, supra note 7, at 63-65 (Table IV.4).
78. 1. MARDFIN, supra note 20, at 26.
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involved small settlements, ten of the settlements in the "no liability" cases
were for over $100,000, and indeed, in three cases, payments of over
$500,000 were made to the plaintiff. These outcomes cannot be attributed to
a biased jury; only one of the thirty cases resolved with a payment to the
plaintiff after a "no liability" panel decision resulted from a jury verdict in
7
favor of the plaintiff.'
Given these results, how should we assess the screening panels'
performance and, indirectly, the utility of this form of ADR for assisting the
settlement process? To be sure, the Hawaii study is not complete, and some
of its insights may be limited by small sample sizes. Nonetheless, it raises
serious questions about the utility of the screening panels in improving the
settlement process. In particular, one could question what happened in fiftythree of the 109 "liability" cases in which the researchers were unsure of the
status of the claims; it is surprising that such a large number of claimants
would simply abandon meritorious claims. If many of these claims have in
fact settled (but the information was unknown), then one may reach a
different conclusion about the utility of the screening process for settlement
purposes.
One could argue that the data suggest that the screening process
contributed positively to the settlement process. Of the cases in which the
researchers knew the results, almost half settled without litigation, and the
bulk of cases in which a lawsuit was filed settled short of trial. By the same
token, however, more must be discovered about when they settled and the
expense involved before one can draw confident conclusions. Moreover, four
of the cases went to trial (constituting approximately 10 percent of the
litigated "liability" cases), and this occurrence suggests a minimal impact on
the part of screening panels, given that this percentage is approximately equal
to the normal trial rate.8ti Even more troubling are the data suggesting a lack
of correlation between the panel's damage assessment and the actual result.
Not only do the researchers suggest that the panel's awards are regularly
below the settlement rates in litigation, but the wide variance suggests overall
unreliability. The concern is exacerbated by the surprising statistics from the
"no liability" cases that are pursued through litigation: More than half of the
plaintiffs
received
compensation-indeed
sometimes
significant
compensation-despite the panel's "no liability" finding. In short, the data
lead one to question the panel's ability to assess the value of the case. This
79. Id. Indeed, of the II "no liability" cases that went to trial resuliing in a final judgment,
defendants won 10.
80. Id. This rate seems comparable to the usual trial rate in medical malpratice cases. See ifa
note 94. Danzon suggested that a likely possible impact of screening panels would be to innease the
rate at which cases went to trial owing to a slight reduction in the incremental costs of litigating once
the expenses associated with the screening panel have been incurred. P. 1)ANZON, su/ra note II, at
199-200. Other counterproductive impacts of the screening panel procedure have been posited. See,
e.g., Corodemus & Ver Strate, Daik 'ictorv: The DooIm of Medical Malpractice Panels, 5 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 31, 55 (1980) (suggesting the data relating to New Jersey's panel indicated that in cases
where a finding of liability was made, it resulted in the plaintiffs significantly inflating their settlement
demands).
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apparent inability may be a function of timing-it is simply too early to make a
good assessment of damages or even liability at the panel stage. However, it
may also reflect a more serious shortcoming in terms of the relevant expertise
of panel members who may well have been selected for medical expertise as
opposed to working knowledge of economics necessary to assess damages.
2. Potential Use of Other ADR Methods in Malpractice Cases. The lack of
empirically proven success on the part of the screening panel, at least in terms
of improving the settlement process, leads one to consider the utility of other
alternatives. Newer ADR methods such as the summary jury trial, 8

court-

annexed arbitration,8' 2 early neutral evaluation, 8 " and mini-trials 8 4 have been
employed on a limited scale in malpractice cases. To date, no empirical
studies have been conducted evaluating the effectiveness of these particular
ADR techniques in malpractice cases. As is generally true in the ADR field,
there has been virtually no creative use of research projects to assist in the
design of specifically tailored ADR programs for particular types of
8 5

litigation.

If such procedures should come to play a significant role in resolving
malpractice cases, the same types of questions raised above in connection with
the screening panel must be asked. A primary component of the theory of
ADR is that it can provide useful information at appropriate stages in the
evolution of the dispute to permit fair and less expensive settlements. Yet, in
81. See Lambros, The Sunima'yJuy Trial. 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984). Given the relative infrequency
of malpractice in federal court (owing to the usual lack of diversity jurisdiction), reports of summary
jury trials in malpractice cases are few, although the process has been used. See Bockweg v. Clark,
No. C-86-936-WS (M.D.N.C.) (summary jury trial held in Greensboro, N.C., Apr. 1988). To date,
only a few states have used or authorized the summaryjury trial. Again, there are scattered accounts
of using the procedure in malpractice cases, but the empirical work suggests that its use to date has
been limited and its impact uncertain. See J. ALFINI, L. GRIFFITiS, R. GETCHELL & 1). JORDAN,
SUMMARY JURY 'RIALS IN FLORIDA: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 31 (1989) (of 43 summary jury trials
studied in Florida state court, none were medical malpractice cases); Lockhart v. Patel. 115 F.R.D. 44
(E.D. Ky. 1987).
82. See, e.g Hensler, II'hat WIe Know and DontI Know About Courit-.ldminstered Arbitration, 69
In most state court programs, the dollar value of cases assigned to cour,JUDICATURE 270 (1986).
annexed arbitration programs is limited, with $15,000 to $25,000 being the norm. Given these
relatively low ceilings, few, if any, malpractice cases would be expected to go through the process.
While the federal courts have higher dollar limits (usually $100,000), fewer malpractice cases are
filed in the federal courts owing to jurisdiction limitations. Nonetheless. some malpractice cases have
gone through the process. See, e.g-.,Frazier v. Urgent Medical Care Center, No. C-87-231-G (courtannexed arbitration hearing. M.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 1988).
83. See Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, Eal ,Veatral Evaluation. AIn Experimental Effort to E.\pedite
Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDICA'i'URE 279 (1986); Levine, .Voitheri District of Califoinia .Aldopts Ealy .Veutral
Evaluation to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 72 JUDICATURE 235 (1989).
84. See, e.g., Olson, .fn .1teirnativefor Latge Case Dispute Resolution, LIiTIGATION, WintCr 1980, at 22;
CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, CONTAINING LEGAL CosTs: AI)R STRATEGIES FOR COR'ORATIONS,
IAw FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 33-43 (1988).
85. Literature on designing resolution for specific dispute contexts is relatively recent, and none
focuses specifically on medical malpractice. See W. URY, J. BRETr & S. GOLDBERG, GE-'1NING DISPUTES
RE;SO.VED (1988) (general discussion of factors to include in designing dispute systems followed by
case study of coal industry); CENTER FOR PUB.IC RESOURCES, sipa note 84 (describing ADR
strategies in a variety of' commercial contexts including products liability disputes, toxic tort cases,
hazardous waste disputes, employment disputes, and technological disputes).
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many cases, there are reasons to question whether in fact ADR can deliver on
its promise. For example, the summary jury trial is an ADR procedure that
occurs in theory after most or all discovery has been completed. The
procedure itself requires significant preparation time. Even if the procedure
is successful in the sense that a settlement is reached after the summary jury
trial, the empirical question remains whether any significant cost savings were
in fact realized .86
Another trend in the ADR field presents other questions. Recently,
considerable energy and interest have been given to the potential use of
mediation techniques in resolving an increasing variety of disputes. The
process of mediation involves the efforts of a neutral mediator, who assists the
parties in identifying areas of agreement, in the hopes that the parties
themselves can negotiate a compromise solution.8 7 At times, the mediator
can play a more active role in suggesting possible areas of compromise. In
theory, mediation is perceived as a useful dispute resolution technique where
there is a need for the disputants to maintain a working relationship, such as
with divorcing parents negotiating a child custody arrangement. To be sure,
states' screening
the term mediation is not always used consistently; some
88
panels seem to suggest that they play a mediation role.
Despite the fact that malpractice has not been identified as an area
particularly well suited to the process, mediation has been used increasingly
as an alternative to the litigation process. For example, judges in a handful of
states now have the power to require the parties to mediate their dispute.8 1 In
fact, malpractice cases have been regularly referred to mediation under
Florida's new program. Wisconsin is also experimenting with a pretrial
procedure that has at least elements of a mediation plan.'"'
7'ial and Other .MIethods of Alernative Dispute Resoution: Some
86. Cf Posner, The Summay Ju
Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cii. L. REV. 366 (1986) (discussing lack of empirical evaluation of
summary jury trial).
87. Seegenerally S. GoL.DBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 91-147 (1985). The
Florida ADR Act of 1987 defines mediation as "a process whereby a neutral third party acts to
encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute without prescribing what it should be. It is an
informal and nonadversarial process with the objective of helping the disputing parties reach a
mutually acceptable agreement." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.301 (West 1988).
88. For example, the title of the reviewing body in Hawaii is the iedical Claim Conciliation
Panel. SeeJ. Ni\RDFIN. .011W1note 20. at i. Despite the fact that the process is sometimes referred to as
,'mediation," the panel is not given any explicit directions to attempt to assist the parties in reaching
a voluntary agreement. See id. at 6-8. Rather, it is hoped that their decision will guide the parties
towards a resolution.
89. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.301-.306 (West 1988) (ADR Act of 1987) (authorizing court in any
civil dispute to refer case to mediation or non-binding arbitration); TEX. Ci'. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§§ 154.001-073 (West Supp. 1987) (Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution Act of 1987) (same).
90. Mediation may be requested prior to commencing suit, but must be requested within 15
days after the suit was filed. WIs. STAr. ANN. § 655.445(l) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988). The
mediation will take place within 90 days before a three-member panel consisting of an attorney, a
doctor, and a public representative. Id. § 655.465. Pending the expiration of the mediation period,
no discovery may be conducted. Id. § 655.58(2). Parties are expected to attend the mediation, and
their attorneys must be prepared to discuss in good faith both liability and damage issues. In fact,
the mediation panel is expected to make a finding on liability and a suggested damage award, thus
calling into serious question whether the proceeding is in fact a mediation or simply a variation upon
the existing screening panel's typical non-binding arbitration approach. See R. SPROUL.E, SUPRFME
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Despite the recent advent of mediation in the malpractice area, there has
been no systematic study of mediation programs in malpractice cases.
Summary statistics from the Wisconsin program raise some initial concerns.
Of the first 250 cases that were processed through the mediation panels, only
twenty-two cases, representing 9 percent of the total, settled as a result of the
mediation. This total, substantially below the initial settlement rate achieved
by most screening panels, may suggest either that the particular procedure
used requires refinement, or that mediation may not be a useful process-at
least as a requirement in all cases or at such an early point in the case. '
The use of ADR procedures in malpractice cases thus requires exploration
of essentially uncharted waters. Empirical research, which has not yet played
a creative role in analyzing the dynamics of the settlement process, could play
an important role in the ADR design process. First, empirical research could
bear on the question whether a particular category of disputes-such as
medical malpractice claims-is sufficiently uniform to suggest a single
alternative process. For example, the recent American Medical Association
suggestion of an alternative system for resolving malpractice claims consists
of a single approach to be substituted for the present system. t 2 This
suggestion necessarily assumes that most malpractice cases are sufficiently
alike to benefit from this uniform, albeit alternative, process. In fact, research
might show that malpractice cases-defined in terms of such variables as: (1)
amount in controversy; (2) factual complexity; (3) variety of factual and legal
issues presented; and (4) damages-fall into significantly distinct categories so
that a flexible ADR approach, such as the "multi-door courthouse approach"
now being experimented with in several courts, is preferable.t
Second, even in designing a single alternative process, empirical research,
if done in such a way as to reveal something of the settlement process itself,
GUIDELINES FOR MEDIA0ioN (1988) (available
from Administrator, Medical Mediation Panels, 110 E. Main St., Suite 320, Madison, Wis. 53703).
91. The Wisconsin Litigation Project is currently carrying out a research project into the
Wisconsin Mediation program pursuant to a grant from the State Justice Institute. See C.
Meschievitz, Mediating Medical Malpractice Cases in Wisconsin: A Preliminary Report (paper
presented at Law and Society Association Meeting in Madison, Wis., June 1989). Early statistical
information raises questions about the utility of the procedure. As of February 1,1988, only 22 out
of the initial 250 cases (9%) had settled during or shortly after the mediation process. R. Sproule,
Status Report of Medical Mediation Panels (Feb. 1, 1988) (available from R. Sproule, Administrator,
110 E. Main Street, Suite 210, Madison, Wis., 53703). A full69% of the claims had ripened into
court disputes, although in approximately half of these cases the attorneys opined that mediation had
served a "constructive purpose." Id.
92. AMA, supra note 5. The plan combines a number of different resolution strategies. After an
initial investigation phase conducted by an employee of the agency charged with administering the
resolution of the disputes, the claim is subject to an evaluation by a neutral expert witness. Asstiming
the claim is still considered to have merit, a hearing officer is assigned. Prior to the hearing, blind
settlement offers are exchanged to see if the parties agree. If not, the officer is authorized to attempt
to mediate the dispute prior to the arbitration of the case. For a description and analysis of the AMA
proposal, compare The Future of Health Care in America: Hearngs Before the Subcotnm. on Education and
Health of the Joint Economic Comim., Part 2, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 445 (1988) (statement of Carter G.
Phillips), with id., at 516 (statement of Thomas B. Metzloft).
93. See, e.g., Edelman, Instititionalizing Dispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 Jusr. Ss. J. 134, 140
(1984).
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could provide important insights regarding specific procedural features to be
included. For example, if the research revealed that settlements are impeded
primarily through the recalcitrance of the defendant doctors themselves (as
opposed to the attorneys), it may be necessary to include the doctor in
whatever process is suggested. Many ADR techniques, including mediation
and the mini-trial, seek to involve the client more directly in the process.
Research into the discovery process and its relationship to settlement, as
already noted, should also reveal important insights. If early settlement is a
goal, understanding what discovery in fact usually precedes settlement may
prove vital. For example, if a sizable number of settlements occur after the
deposition of the defendant, then perhaps a preferred procedural template
for malpractice cases should require or at least suggest that this deposition
occur early in the process. In addition, patterns of pre-litigation settlement
would certainly suggest potentially attractive avenues for developing ADR
mechanisms. Another major challenge here would be an improved
understanding of the use of expert opinion by the parties in the settlement
process. Malpractice cases are distinctive in that they routinely require expert
analysis. To date, ADR theory has not focused clearly on the challenge of
employing experts.
IV
THE ROLE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE JURY IN

MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

As with other types of litigation, only a small fraction of medical
4
malpractice cases-fewer than 10 percent-are resolved by a jury.9
Nevertheless, the influence ofjury verdicts is seen as central in explaining the
medical malpractice crisis. Jury verdicts arguably provide the going rate for
specific types of injuries, thus establishing the framework for negotiation and
settlement of similar malpractice claims.1 5 Further, some argue that increases
in the number and size of awards increase the rate at which claims are asserted

94. P. DANZON,supra note 11, at 31-32 (noting that about 7% of a sample of 6000 claims closed
in 1974 and 1976 were tried to a verdict); GAO REPORT, slpra note 16, at 37 (indicating that of claims
closed in 1984 only about 5% were tried to completion). Preliminary results from Our study of
litigated malpractice cases (where a lawsuit is filed) in North Carolina between 1984 and 1987
indicate that about 7% of malpractice suits actually went to jury trial.
95. See, e.g'. S. DANIELS & L. ANDREWS, THE SHADOW OF THE LAW: JURY DECISIONS IN OBSTETRICS
AND GYNECOLOGY CASES 3-4, 9 (1988); H. KALVEN AND H. ZEISEI., THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); H.
Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1970);

Alschuler, Vediation with a .MIugger: The Shoitage of Adjudicative Services and the AVeedfor a Two Tier Trial
System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. RFv. 1808 (1986); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainiig i the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1970). 6f Willard, The Vedical Valpractice Crisis, in
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-TORT REFORM 6 (1987) (describing $65 million malpractice judgment,
which, even after being reduced to $3.3 million by the court, -influences plaintiffs and their attorneys
to press marginal or frivolous claims, and it often forces insurers into settling cases for far more than
they are realistically worth").
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by raising the expected payoff from litigation.19" In short, what juries do, or
are perceived as doing, colors the entire litigation process.
Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that the frontal assault by critics of
the malpractice litigation system is often directed at the jury. Many go so far
as to conclude that the present system is nothing short of a lottery; others
label jury verdicts as "capricious," claiming that juries fail to compensate
some plaintiffs adequately and vastly overcompensate others.1 7 Underlying
these assertions is a premise about competence: Groups of laymen cannot
understand or effectively evaluate the complex issues of causation and the
appropriate standard of medical care presented in most malpractice cases."
Given both the public nature of the jury's involvement and its perceived
importance, empirical analysis of the jury's role would be important in
assessing the accuracy of the criticisms. As proof of the jury's inabilities, the
critics assert that there has been a dramatic and unjustified increase in
malpractice jury awards over time, which is a manifestation of a perceived pro96. See Danzon, The Frequency and Severiy of Medical Ialpiactice Claims: .New Evidence, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 57.
97. AMA, supra note 5, at 4 (statement ofJeffrey O'Connell that results ofjury system "are often
fortuitous, yet society pays high costs for operating this unsatisfactory lottery"). See PRIVATE SECTOR
CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 81 (statement ofJames S. Todd that "[w]e apparently have a system
that is slow, expensive, cumbersome, inequitable, and probably patently unfair"); l)aniels and
Andrews, supra note 95, at 2-3; Nutter, The Fight for CivilJustice Refori, INS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 2;
Weaver, The Model Health Care PIovider Liability Refori Act, 49 N.C. MED. J. 621, 623 (1988) ("Itihe
current jury system is expensive, unpredictable, time consuming, and as a result, inequitable for all
parties").
98. PRIVATE SECTOR CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 17 (statement ofJohn A.D. Cooper noting
that the "complexity of modern medical care makes it increasingly difficult for a jury" to distinguish
between physician negligence and the inherent risks of interventionist techniques); Schwarz, Liabilit ,
Ciisis: The Physician i l'iewpont, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICF-TORT REFORM 24 (1987) (juries are
'seemingly incapable of separating their personal feelings from the evidence in the cases and
instinctively wish to help the plaintiffs as they would want others to help them if they were in a similar
situation.'').
At another level, the medical profession is simply uncomfortable with permitting lay people to
serve as judges of professional standards. A good example of this point can be found in a recent
paper based upon a panel discussion published by the Roscoe Pound Foundation. After a lengths
discussion in which there was substantial agreement that juries frequently find for the defendant, a
medical representative, while agreeing with the results, refuted the consequences noting that doctors
"'have an inherent hatred and distrust of the system . . . and they are going to do anything and
everything within their economic power to take it to another forum . .. even though the statistics
don't bear out the idea that there are going to be any more defense verdicts, or any lower ones ...
doctors can't stand having lay people try their cases even though they do wonderfully [before
them]." J. GUINTHER, snpra note 11, at 11.
In addition to the competency critique, commentators have alleged that jury trials are overly time
consuming and expensive. A recent study based upon direct observation of 58 professional
malpractice trials in three different states-a small sample to be sure-indicated an average
malpractice trial length of approximately 17 hours, compared to an average civil trial length of
slightly over 13 hours. 1).SIPES

&

M. ORAM, ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIviL. AND CRIMINAL rRIAiLS

9-10 (1988). This average exceeded, although only slightly, the average trial lengths for motor
vehicle cases, contract disputes, other tort cases, and "other civil" cases, but was notably less than
the 26 hour, 23 minute average for product liability cases. Id. To be sure, there are likely to be
significant variations among courts depending upon local practice, judicial management, and the
complexity of the malpractice cases being tried. Id. at 27 (noting high of 41 hours, 5 minutes in
Denver compared to low of 12 hours, 57 minutes for a single trial in Marin County, Cal.) Based upon
our preliminary review ofjury' trials in North Carolina, the average time for a medical malpractice
trial is approximately five days, although significant variations do exist.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 51: No. 4

plaintiff bias. While the alleged problem of runaway juries transcends medical
malpractice, the problem is thought to be especially severe in this litigation
context. -I l Given the jury's discretionary power to award damages, especially
non-economic and punitive damages, the result is said to be a system out of
control. 10o
A.

Studies of Jury Decisions

Unlike criticism regarding other litigation issues on which little or no
empirical evidence exists, some of the criticisms of juries have been
buttressed with references to empirical studies. In some instances, however,
the studies are methodologically inadequate."" 1 In other instances, the critics
have ignored the limited application of the few actual studies addressed to the
question of what juries do in malpractice trials. ' 2 These studies, which are
summarized below, provide some information about jury behavior, but are
equally instructive in what they do not tell us.
Danzon and Lillard conducted the first systematic study of jury outcomes
in medical malpractice cases.""' Their data set was derived from insurance
company files involving approximately 6000 claims that were closed in 1974
and 1976. The files lacked much potentially important data, 1114 but they were
99. M. PETERSON, COMPENSATION OF INJURIES: CIVILJURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY 35 (1984).
100. Another aspect of the jury critique is the concern with punitive damages. Fo date, there is
no empirical evidence to establish that juries in malpractice cases award punitive damages on
anything approaching a regular basis. Instead, the existing studies, dealing with a wider variety of
malpractice cases, tend to show that punitive damages: (a) are infrequently awarded by juries; (b)
tend to be confined mostly to cases involving intentional torts; and (c) are usually modest in size
when they are awarded. There were oniy a few cases involving malpractice awards reported in these
studies. See NI. PETERSON, S. SARMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAl, FINDINGS (1987):
M. PETERSON, S. SARMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A RELIC THAT HAS OUTIiVED ITS ORIGINS

(1987). See generally S. Daniels & J. Martin, Empirical Patterns in Punitive Damage Cases: A
Description of Incidence Rates and Awards (paper presented at Law and Society Association Meeting
in Washington, D.C., June, 1987).
101. See Localio, Variationts on S962,258: The 1isuse of Data on .Medical Ialpractire. 13 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 126 (1985), and J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 192-93 (1988). Localio reports
that a 1982 report based on data gathered by Jury Verdicts Research, Inc., was quoted in
congressional hearings to support arguments that jury verdicts are out of control. Those data
indicated that the average malpractice award was $962,258, but there are multiple grounds for
treating this figure as extremely misleading. First, the total sample consisted of 238 cases. Second,
the cases were derived fiom newspaper clippings and reports voluntarily submitted by attorneys: this
form of selective data gathering will restlt in reporting of large awards but not modest awards or
defendant victories. Third, even with this unrepresentative sample, the average award can be a
highly misleading summary statistic since it can be inflated dramatically as a result of a few very large
awards. The more usefil statistic is the median, which is the midpoint of the distribution of awards.
J. GUINTIIER, supra, at 193, reports that the median award for the Jury Verdict Research, Inc.,
distributions was approximately $200,000, a figure that is much less startling. The methodological
criticisms of verdict reporter research with respect to all categories of cases have been made
previously. See N. Vidmar, On Libel and Civil Juries (paper presented at Law and Society Association
Meeting in Washington, D.C., June, 1987).
102. See Nutter, supra note 97; Saks, In Search of the "Lawsuit Crisis, - 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE
77 (1985).
103. Danzon and Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Clams, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 345 (1983). See also P. DANZON, supra note 11, at 31-57.
104. See P. DANZON, supra note I1, at 31. For each claim, the files include information about the
plaintiff, the defendant, the severity of the injury, the insurer's estimate of economic loss, the date of
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sufficient to allow the researchers to report some summary statistics and to
utilize regression analyses to test hypotheses about relationships between
different variables associated with case outcomes. The researchers made the
following basic findings: In the 7 percent of the sample cases res'olved by jury,
plaintiffs prevailed only about one time in four. 11 5 When the plaintiff did
prevail, the average award was $102,000. This figure was substantially higher
than the average recovery of $26,000 in those cases that were settled.'0 "
Significantly, Danzon and Lillard's model noted the importance of
identifying the characteristics of those malpractice cases that actually went to
trial as opposed to those that were dismissed or settled prior to trial. Given
that only a small proportion of litigated cases are tried, the question whether
that proportion reflects a particular selection bias is critical in understanding
the role and performance of the jury. Significantly, Danzon and Lillard
concluded that cases that went to trial were not typical malpractice cases.
Instead, they found that trial cases consisted primarily of cases in which: (1)
liability was difficult to prove; (2) large potential damages were involved; and
(3) the plaintiff's proof was relatively weak. Thus, the cases that actually went
to trial were
"self' selected" to that stage of disposition precisely because the outcome was
unpredictable to the litigants, the potential award was large, and the evidence for the
plaintiff was weak. Thus we get a very biased impression of the operation of the
malpractice system from observing the minority of more visible cases that are litigated
to verdict rather than the great majority of cases that are settled out of court. 107

the injury, the dates of the filing and closing of the claim, and the outcome-amount of payment and
state of disposition. Only the 1974 survey reports specific allegations made by the plaintiff', and only
the 1976 survey reports whether the plaintiff had attorney representation. The insurance company
claim files give no information about the bargaining process that led up to the outcome, nor do they
indicate what the outcome of a settled case might have been if it had been taken to verdict.

105.

Id.

106. Id. at 31; Danzon and Lillard, supra note 103, at 347.
The Danzon and Lillard data also provide some insight into the types of cases in which plaintiffs
won. The probability of the plaintiff prevailing at trial was lower if the claim was based on allegations
of misdiagnosis or failure to obtain informed consent than if it involved obvious error or if the
doctrine of res ipsa loqoitnr was invoked. P. I)ANZON, so/na note 11, at 38-39. Ihe plaintiff's
probability of obtaining a favorable verdict was also greater if the injury was permanent rather than
temporary, and greater still if the injury was fatal. i. at 38. SeeJ. GtUIN'rnHER, s1pra note 101, at 179
(noting that large verdicts were clearly associated with grave or major injuries, thus providing little
credence to the "'jackpot" criticism ofjuries in malpractice cases). Although the data on economic
loss were incomplete, Danzon utilized three rough measures of compensable injury-the insurer's
estimate of economic loss, the severity of injury, and the age of the plaintiff-to analyze the question
and determined that there was evidence that the degree of economic loss was positively related to the
amount of damages awarded. P. DANZON, s1pra note I I, at 40. Specifically, she found that the
median shadow verdict lor claims involving permanent disability was roughly twice that for claims
involving death. Id. However, the data tended to indicate that juries did not give higher awards to
plaintiffs with higher earning power, a result that is inconsistent with the legal goal of compensating
according to economic loss. Id.
107. P. DANZON, supra note 1I, at 51. A number of econometric models relating to the bargaining
process have attempted to analyze the selection bias in order to predict which subset of cases is more
likely to go to trial. Most such studies have similarly indicated that cases with potentially large
awards are likely to be tried. See Wittman, Dispute Resolution. Baigainiig, and the Selection of Cases for
Trial A Study of the Genematiot of Biased and U'nbiased Data, 17J. LEGAL. STUo. 313 (1988); Priest & Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for l.itsgation. 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). While these discussions relate to
litigation generally, related works focus on malpractice. Danzon & Lillard, supra note 103.
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TABLE

1

MALPRACTICE VERDICTS IN COOK CO., ILL., AND SAN FRANCISCO
CO., CALIFORNIA
Jurisdiction/
Period

Percent of
All Trials

Proportion of
Plaintiff Victories

Median Award
in $000"*

56

2%

.25

$ 35

$

68
100
134
162

2%
3%
5%
5%

.29
.29
.33
.49

$ 48
$127
$141
$121

$ 83
$ 605
$ 324
$1179

Jurisdiction/

Number

Period

of Trials

Percent of
All Trials

Proportion of
Plaintiff Victories

Median Award
in $000"*

Average Award
in $000'*

7%
6%
7%
8%
9%

.27
.35
.43
.32
.53

$ 64
$157
$124
$ 99
$156

$ 125
$ 306
$ 409
$ 644
$1162

Cook County
1960-64

1965-69
1970-74
1975-79
1980-84

Number
of Trials

Average Award
in $000"*

52

San Francisco
County

1960-64
1965-69
1970-74
1975-79
1980-84

95
88
98
81
55

** Adjusted for general rate of inflation, awards are in 1984 dollars.
Source:

NI. PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980's: TRENDS INJURY TRIALS AND VERDICS IN
CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY,

ILLINOIS

(1987).

A series of studies undertaken by researchers at Rand's Institute for Civil
Justice also provides information about jury outcomes in malpractice cases. 108
The data were derived from verdict reporters tl l' for Cook County, Illinois,
and a number of California courts including some in San Francisco. The time
period was extensive, covering twenty-five years between 1960 and 1984, and
thus allowed for analyses of trends over time. The research focus was inclusive of all types of cases, but disaggregations of types of claims, including
malpractice, were made.' n
108. M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 19601979 (1982); IM. PETERSON, COMPENSATION OF INJURIFS: CIviL, JURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY
(1984); A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMiPTv POCKETS: WiiO WINS IN COOK COUNTYJURY
TRIALS (1985); M. PETERSON, CIVILJURIES IN TIlE 1980s: TRENDS IN JURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN
CAI.IFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1987) [hereinafter CIVI. JURIES1.
109. "Verdict reporters" is a generic name for compilations of jury verdicts.
'ypically, they
report the type of case, the names of plaintiff and defendant, the names of legal counsel, the names
of expert witnesses, and the verdict. Verdict reporters vary in their degree of comprehensiveness,
with some reporting only selected cases within a given jurisdiction, see supra note 101, and others
reporting all cases: the amount of additional information provided also varies. For an overview and
discussion of verdict reporters as sources of data, see S. Daniels, CivilJuries: Jury Verdict Reporters,
and the Going Rate (paper presented at Law and Society Association Meeting in Chicago, Ill., May
1986).
110. ]'he Rand studies have not disaggregated medical malpractice cases from other forms of
malpractice such as legal or accounting malpractice. However, these latter types of cases account for
a small fraction of the total of malpractice cases and are unlikely to affect significantly any
conclusions drawn about medical malpractice. Letter from 1). Hensler, The Institute for CivilJustice,
to N. Vidmuar (1988).
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Some of these data, derived from various tables in a recent report,' '' have
been collated in Table 1. The table shows that in both Cook and San Francisco Counties the chance of a plaintiff victory (if one focuses solely on jury
trials) almost doubled between 1960 and 1984, from one chance in four to
one in two. The table also shows that the average award increased dramatically in both jurisdictions over the quarter century, but the rise in the median
award, while substantial, was not nearly so great. This research suggests that
a relatively small number of very large awards were given; typical awards were
more modest. The final two columns show, however, that the two counties
exhibited very different trends in the number of malpractice trials and the
percentage of the trial docket taken by malpractice cases. In Cook County,
the number of malpractice trials increased almost 300 percent from 1960 to
1984 (from 56 to 162), but in San Francisco the number of trials decreased by
almost 50 percent (from 95 to 55). At the same time malpractice cases consumed a greater percentage of the trial calendar in both counties.
Although the lack of additional information prevents development of
causal hypotheses, one can draw at least one important conclusion: Despite
similarities in trends of plaintiff victories and damage awards, the two jurisdictions must have had significantly different settlement patterns resulting in different types of cases being tried. In other words, the profile of the subset of
malpractice cases actually going to trial over time must surely have changed
significantly and in different ways in these two jurisdictions. The interesting
question then involves understanding the reasons for the change, which
would seem to involve different settlement patterns having developed among
insurers, defense attorneys, and plaintiffs' attorneys. Unfortunately, the verdict reporters do not inform us further on this question. All that is known is
that the data strongly support the inference that between jurisdictions and
within jurisdictions over time, juries were probably trying different types of
malpractice cases. This makes comparative conclusions of any sort difficult
without extensive additional data to provide statistical control over the differences, whatever they may be.
Stephen Daniels and his colleagues at the American Bar Foundation
("ABF") have also gathered data on malpractice cases by utilizing verdict
reporters. 2 One important aspect of this research is its breadth of coverage:
forty-six counties in eleven different states between 1981 and 1985.1" An
important finding from the data set is the significant variations that exist
among jurisdictions on a number of variables. Indeed, probably the most
important conclusion to be drawn from Daniels' research is that there appear
to be no discernible nationwide trends in malpractice verdicts and awards.
I11. M. PETERSON, CIVII. JURIES, Supra note 108.
112. S. DANIELS & L. ANDREWS, S0tpla note 95. See Daniels and Martin,J]ry Verdirs aid the "Crisis
In Civil Justice. II JusT. Svs. J. 321 (1986).
113. S. DANIELIS & L. ANI)REWS, sIMa note 95, at 9 (Table 1). These locations were not a
representative sample in the statistical sense, but they do reflect data collected from an array of
diverse jurisdictions ranging rom large urban counties, including major cities such as Los Angeles,
Chicago, and New York, to several smaller metropolitan areas.
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First, there are significant differences as to how much of the trial docket is
made up of malpractice cases. Thus, in the eleven New York counties
included in the sample, over 17 percent of all civil cases that went to trial were
malpractice cases as compared to only 3.9 percent in the two Texas counties
included.' 14 Second, there was a wide variation in plaintiff's success rates in
malpractice cases both within and among states: Among the seven Illinois
counties, success rates varied from about 18 percent to 47 percent; in New

York, the variation ranged between 20 percent and 56 percent.' '5 In all but
two small counties, however, one pattern emerged: The plaintiff's success
rate in malpractice cases was below the overall rate of success across the entire
range of verdicts. I'
1
The ABF work is especially interesting given that it involves a sufficient
number of observed cases to provide a further breakdown on an important
subcategory of malpractice cases: obstetrical and gynecological ("OB-GYN")
cases. Their sample included 364 verdicts in OB-GYN cases, in which plaintiffs prevailed in 134, a success rate approximately the same as that in the
universe of malpractice cases, although again, substantial variations among

114. Id at Table 3. An interesting question is whether this wide variation could be explained at
least in part bv different jurisdictional provisions affecting the character of cases litigated in the
particular courts studied. To the extent that a state employs specialized courts to handle particular
types of cases, the docket of the court handling malpractice cases, usually the court of general
jurisdiction within the state, could be significantly affected. The report does not describe any
jurisdictional differences among the courts studied.
115. Id.
116. In 44 out of 46 counties, the plaintiffs' success rate in malpractice cases was below the
overall success rate. The only exceptions were Clay County, Mo., and Spokane, Wash., each of which
had a total of only four malpractice verdicts. Interestingly, the variation among plaintiffs' success
rates was fairly consistent in the largest counties. Thus, for the six counties with over 1000 total
verdicts, the variations were as follows: (1)Maricopa County, Ariz., 58.4% overall success rate as
compared to 28.0% success rate in malpractice cases; (2) Los Angeles County, Cal., 55.7% to 30.8%;
(3) Cook Counts, Ill.,
57.9% to 33.8%; (4) New York County, N.Y., 64.6% to 43.3%; (5) Dallas
County, Tex., 50.9% to 21.4%; and (6) Harris Counts, Vex., 55.5% to 10.3%. Id. at 13 (Table 3).
This polycentric picture can be supplemented by descriptive accounts provided by individual
state reporting agencies. For example, a limited study ofjury verdicts in Dade County, Fla., between
January 1985 and March 1987 indicates that plaintiffs prevailed in 53.9% of malpractice cases that
went to trial. The median damage award was between $50,000 and $250,000, but the mean, or
average, award was $885,767. The discrepancy between mean and median can be ascribed to the fact
that 12 of the 62 awards (19.4%) exceeded one million dollars. Punitive damages were awarded in
only 4.8% of cases (or three cases in total) where the plaintiff received compensatory damages. In
contrast, punitive damages were awarded in 6.7% of all types of'jury verdicts. See FiLoRIDA ACADEMIC
TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS,

FINAL. FACT-FINDING

REPORT ON

INSURANCE AND ToRer SYSiEMs 248-257 (Mar. 1, 1988). See geerallv Gifford & Nye, Litgation Trends in
Foloida: Saga of a Growth State, 39 U. Ft.A. L. REV. 829 (1987).

In Kansas, data on 1988 trials indicate that 23 malpractice cases wvent to trial. Plaintiffs prevailed
in seven cases (30.4%). The median award was $125,000, but two of the malpractice verdicts were
for over one million dollars. Across the range of civil litigation cases, only six verdicts (including the
two malpractice cases) exceeded one million dollars. No punitive damages were awarded in any
malpractice case. OFFICE OF JuI)ICIAL ADMINISTRAriON, KANSAS JUDICIAL CENTER, JURY VERDICTS IN
FoRl CASES (Dec. 1988).
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courts were noted.' 17 Indeed, the researchers provided even a further breakdown among types of OB-GYN cases defined in terms of established injury
characteristics.'

Is

The most interesting findings here related to those OB-GYN cases
involving the management of labor and delivery. These claims are generally
understood to be among the most significant malpractice claims and indeed
have served as areas of special legislative attention;' I, accordingly, any findings relating to them are especially noteworthy. With respect to this important group of cases, the plaintiffs' success rate was 44.7 percent, which was
above the overall OB-GYN rate of 36.8 percent and above the overall malpractice rate of 32.4 percent. 120 Moreover, the median level of damages for
this group was the highest recorded.' 2 1 The question then is what to make of
this elegant description of malpractice verdicts. The ABF's conclusion is that
the data show that the malpractice system is not a lottery since patterns do
2 2

occur. 1

Some preliminary findings from our own ongoing study of malpractice litigation in the state of North Carolina provide further insight into the nature of
the empirical issues raised above. As part of the study, we are examining in
detail the court records for all medical malpractice cases filed in the state
between June 1984 and July 1987. The final data set will total approximately
950 cases. We currently estimate that about 7 percent of the sample, or about
sixty cases, were tried to verdict by ajury. At present we have data bearing on
forty-seven cases, which we believe to be representative of the total trial
group.' 2 Of the forty-seven cases, there have been ten plaintiff victories,
establishing a plaintiff success rate of approximately 21 percent. In the cases
where plaintiffs prevailed, one resulted in an award of $750,000 and another
in an award of over $300,000; however, in the remaining cases the awards
ranged between $0 and $41,000, with an average of $15,900.
At first blush, these data suggest that North Carolina juries cannot be characterized as being either pro-plaintiff or consistently extravagant in their
awards when they do find medical professionals liable. A closer examination
of some of the characteristics of the North Carolina cases reveals some interesting findings. First, in the two cases resulting in large plaintiff's verdicts,
the defendant's negligence appears reasonably clear, indicating that the cases
117. S. DANIELS & L. ANDREWS, supra note 95, at 14.
118. Id. at 15-17 (Table 5) (variables based upon severity of injury, cause of injury, and class of
injury).
119. For example, Virginia recently enacted legislation providing a no-fault recovery for certain
children born with neurological problems. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000-5021 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
120. S. )ANIELS & L. ANDREWS, supra note 95, at 12 (Table 5).
121. Id. at 22-25.
122. Id. at 23.
123. At the time of our initial research, approximately 15% of the cases reviewed were still
pending. Clearly, a percentage of these cases will ultimately be tried. Since there may be significant
variation in the proportion and indeed type of cases that were still pending, any analysis is necessarily
preliminary. Because all malpractice cases are being reviewed, there is no bias attributable to
sampling methods.
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probably went to trial over the amount of damages.' 24 Second, a surprisingly
large number of cases were minor disputes. For example, five of the fortyseven trial cases involved dentists rather than physicians, a proportion significantly higher than dental cases in the total group of litigated cases. Also,
three of the trial cases, while litigated as malpractice cases, could be categorized as slip and fall cases because they involved injuries sustained from falls
from examination tables. Another of the cases, while also litigated as a malpractice case, actually involved a claim that certain autopsy procedures carried
out by a pathologist had not been authorized by a deceased child's mother.
Between ten and twelve of the cases could arguably be considered trivial or
25
possibly non-meritorious suits given the nature of the alleged injuries.'
B.

Conceptual and Methodological Insights

Given the various studies described above along with a few reflections
from our ongoing research, what observations can fairly be drawn concerning
the present state of the research effort? Based on the above studies, there is
little support for the contention that juries in malpractice cases are proplaintiff and consistently inclined to award large sums of money to prevailing
plaintiffs; indeed, it is possible to argue just the opposite, namely that juries
are pro-defendant and often conservative in awarding damages. In truth,
however, even this limited conclusion is questionable for several reasons.
First, the studies and our own work clearly indicate that trial cases are, as a
whole, not a typical subset of malpractice cases. Whether there is a constant
selection bias is less clear. The large variability across jurisdictions described
by Daniels and Andrews underscores the point as well. The North Carolina
results present a different picture of the selection bias than did Danzon's
pioneering work. Whereas Danzon found that complex cases of uncertain
liability or potentially large damages were disproportionately tried, our North
Carolina observations reveal a different trial selection-one that is biased
towards the selection of minor, indeed perhaps trivial, cases along with cases
of clear liability where the parties are asking the jury to resolve disagreements
over damages. Given the Rand study, it seems apparent that a more likely
explanation is that the nature of those malpractice cases being tried may well
change over time and may well vary between jurisdictions. Thus, a central
task is to explore the nature of the selection bias further and to account for
sources of variations.
The concern with selection bias also serves to underscore the importance
of settlement. Without a comparison against the settlement patterns in the
different jurisdictions, it is not possible to assess the workings of the system
124. One involved a dosage of chemotherapy drugs that was ten times the recommended dose;
the other involved an eventual death resulting from the insertion of an anesthesia tube into the
trachea rather than the esophagus on two successive but separate operations.
125. For example, one court file in a smaller community contains a rather remarkable letter from
the plaintiff's lawyer to the judge apologizing for taking the case to trial and blaming a "difficult"
client. Other files clearly involve only claims of enotional damage or minor injuries that, on surface
reading of the file, suggest that liability would be difficult to prove.
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properly. Taking cognizance of the trial selection bias and its changing
character confirms the need to analyze the settlement process in its totality.
Studies of jury verdicts that ignore comparative data on the other legal claims
that did not go to trial are misleading because there is no way of determining
how typical the trial cases are. Individual jurisdictions have their own legal
cultures and other exigencies that affect settlement patterns, and, therefore,
the kinds of cases that go to trial. Furthermore, these patterns change over
time. Some attempts have been made to gather additional data from verdict
reporters or insurers' files to control statistically some of the potential
differences over time or across jurisdictions by means of regression analyses.
The difficulty with this approach is that these additional data are often
incomplete, provide information only about gross characteristics of cases, and
give no insights into the processes that led to the jury verdict. This discussion
thus brings us to a second major methodological issue, namely the danger of
studying only verdict outcomes.
One problem with focusing on jury verdicts is the potential for
overlooking the importance of posttrial modifications of the awards through
other litigation means. While a large verdict itself may have an impact on
other cases, it is clear that the litigation system provides numerous means by
which jury verdicts can be modified. Most notably, the trial court has
significant power in this regard, having the ability to: (1) grant a judgment in
favor of the defendant despite the jury's decision; (2) order a new trial; or (3)
require the plaintiff to accept a reduction in the amount awarded by the jury.
In addition, the defendant may appeal and may then obtain relief of some
sort. Finally, the parties may voluntarily agree to a settlement after trial in
order to avoid the uncertainty of the appellate process. 12( Taken collectively,
this array of post-verdict adjusting mechanisms potentially constitutes a
significant limitation on aberrant juries.
Until recently, this posttrial period was one of the least studied aspects of
the procedural system. Two recent reports, however-both of which
collected data on medical malpractice verdicts-have at least begun a serious
consideration of posttrial adjustments. In the first study, Broder conducted a
survey to determine the ultimate outcomes in cases where the jury initially
awarded over $1.0 million in damages.' 2 7 She concluded that in malpractice
cases, the average large verdict was reduced by 27 percent during the posttrial
126. Indeed, the parties may have a pretrial settlement agreement that results in a reduction or
increase of a jury's award. Such high-low agreements set the outside bounds of a flexible settlement.
If the jury comes in with a verdict outside the upper range, the plaintiff has agreed to accept the
"high." Similarly, if the jury comes in with a defendant's verdict, the plaintiff still obtains the "low."
127. Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar .Awards: Jnr V erdicts and Final Disbursements, I I JUST.
Ss.J. 349 (1986). The entire sample consisted of 537 cases constituting all known cases over a twoyear period between 1982 and 1983. Information was returned on 472 cases, which was found to be
usable in 362 cases. Of this group, 198 cases (55%) had been finallv terminated, while 164 cases
(45%) were still on appeal. Medical malpractice cases constituted approximately 20% of the sample.
i'he report does not set forth whether the closure rate for malpractice cases varied from other
categories of cases, nor does it report the means of termination (trial court adjustment, appeal, or
voluntarv settlement).
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process. This percentage was typical of that found in other types of cases. '28
Elsewhere in the report, Broder stated that as among different types of
defendants (business, government, individuals, health care facilities, and
utilities), health care facilities-the typical medical malpractice defendanthad the highest average awards after all posttrial adjustments were
considered. ''2 Also, for all types of cases, the reductions were proportionally
greater in those cases in which plaintiffs suffered less rather than more severe
injuries. 130

A Rand study conducted by Shanley and Peterson involving a larger
sample also confirmed the fact that posttrial adjustments are potentially
significant.' 31' This study showed that, overall, 80 percent of jury verdicts
remained unchanged after trial. The researchers estimated that for medical
malpractice cases, the average final amount paid was 67 percent of the
original verdict; in other words, the average reduction for jury verdict awards
in malpractice cases was 33 percent.

13

2

It is important to observe that the

percentage of reductions varied substantially according to the size of the
original verdict. For verdicts involving $100,000 or less, the average
reduction was approximately 9 percent. 133 For cases in the range from
$100,000 to $1.0 million, the average reduction was 20 percent. For the few
cases with an initial award over $1.0 million, the average reduction was 39
percent. 13 4 If these results are confirmed in subsequent studies, they would
tend to suggest that the public concern with runaway juries might be
effectively handled by the existing system.
There are substantial problems in interpreting the meaning of the two
verdict adjustment surveys. Broder's statistics were based only on closed
cases, constituting only a small proportion of an already limited sample.
Similarly, Shanley and Peterson's study obtained data on only about half of
the large verdicts in their sample. If the reduction ratios for cases taking
longer to close were significantly different than those resolved sooner, the
128. Id. at 355.
129. Id. at 354-55.
130. Id. at 356-57.
131. M. SHANLEY & NI. PETERSON, POSTrRIAL ADJUSTMENTS [O JURY AWARDS (1987). Fhe
researchers used a stratified random sampling plan dividing cases by size of jury verdict and by court
to identify 880 cases for review out of a total universe of jury trials consisting of 3214 cases from
federal and state courts located in either Cook Count', Ill., San Francisco County, Cal.. or "other
courts" in California. For the selected cases, survey forms were mailed to the attorneys involved in
the trial seeking: (I) confirmation of the jury's verdict; and (2) information on posttrial adjustments.
The response rate was approximately 60% and provided information on 621 closed cases. The data
on the sampled closed cases were then used to estimate adjustment percentages for the entire
universe of 3214 cases.
132. Id. at 27, 45. The estimates were based upon data received from posttrial adjustment
information obtained from 37 closed medical malpractice cases. This information was then used to
estimate post-adjustment ratios for the 76 malpractice cases in the total trial database of 3214 cases.
133. Id. at 45 (showing that average jury award of $43,000 resulted ii an average payment of
$39,000, constituting approximately 91% of the initial amount).
134. Id. This percentage was based on information from only six of twelve cases in the sample.
The remaining cases in the sample consisted primarily of open cases, as the authors noted that large
verdicts remained open substantially longer than smaller verdicts due in part to the length of the
appellate process. Id at 24-25.
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final figures might lead one to different conclusions about the posttrial
system. The statistical summaries for both studies utilized averages, a
summary statistic that, as already noted, could obscure skewed distributions.
Furthermore, in neither study were the data disaggregated as to the specific
mechanism of posttrial adjustment (trial or appellate court adjustment or
voluntary settlement between the parties). As with jury verdicts themselves,
then, empirical data on posttrial verdict adjustments are incomplete, and
more detail on the adjustment process-and its impact on the overall dynamic
of the settlement process-is required.
While the data provide important insights into the jury's performance, it is
not possible without further information to make a definitive assessment of
the jury's role. Indeed, one could argue that the high success level and high
damages in the labor and delivery OB-GYN cases found by Daniels and
Andrews raise a concern with this high profile area of malpractice litigation.
Furthermore, because verdict reporters provide no information on the
processes by which the outcomes were produced, no conclusions about the
quality of the verdicts can be drawn.
Second, without some means of assessing whether the results in specific
cases were appropriate, analysis of the juries' competence is not possible.
Daniels and Andrews defined success as the plaintiff winning $1. This
definition is too one-dimensional to permit a proper evaluation of the juries'
role. In order to fully comprehend the juries' performance, the result-the
verdict-must be compared normatively to some appropriate standard. Zero
verdicts may be errors. More importantly, a nominal plaintiff's victory may
indeed reflect an award well below the plaintiff's anticipated recovery. In
short, in assessing jury competence, it is as important to compare the amount
of damages awarded with the anticipated results as it is to note whether the
plaintiff received the verdict.
Consider for a moment a hypothetical example of a study of jury verdicts
in a jurisdiction where one could be confident that basic settlement dynamics
had not changed between time period A and time period B. That is, juries
were hearing the same kinds of cases. Assume further, that in comparison to
time A, juries at time B found in favor of the plaintiff more often and gave

larger damage awards. Although one hypothesis to explain the result is that
juries became more favorable to plaintiffs, we can generate a host of
alternative hypotheses. A listing of a few of these competing hypotheses will
suffice to make the point. Alternative Hypothesis 1: Changes in substantive
or procedural law tipped the scales in favor of plaintiffs.' 13 5 Alternative
Hypothesis 2: Members of the plaintiff bar improved in their ability to litigate
cases by becoming specialists, improving the number and quality of theories
of negligence, finding the right kinds of expert witnesses, and developing
more effective modes of presenting their cases to the jury. Alternative
135.

For example, analyses contained in both Danzon, supra note 96, and in the Rand studies, see.

e.g., M. PETERSON, CIVII.JURIES. supra note 108, at 16-19, indicate that changes fiom contributory to

comparative negligence standards had a significant impact on verdicts.
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Hypothesis 3: Actual economic losses suffered by the plaintiff increased due
to rapidly increasing costs of corrective and palliative care and, in cases of
very serious injury, increased life expectancy due to improved medical
technology. These alternative explanations, none of which are necessarily
exclusive of the others, are all plausible. Nevertheless, they would not be
contained in the insurers' file data utilized by Danzon or in the verdict
reporters utilized by Rand and the ABF researchers, or, it should be added, in
the court files from which we derived our research data.
There are ways to obtain empirical data bearing on the various
hypotheses, all of which require case by case analysis and then aggregation
over cases. Lawyers can be interviewed and their files examined to determine
the degree of similarity of cases that are tried versus settled. Systematic
attempts can be made to observe trials and interview jurors about their
decisionmaking processes. Estimates of the actual quantum of economic
damages in a case can be determined by independent experts and compared
to the jury decision.'13 6 It is also possible to have the presiding trial judge
make an independent estimate of the issues of liability and damages before
the jury returns and compare that estimate against the jury decision.'13 7
Various forms of simulation experiments could be undertaken in which the
jury deliberation process is recorded and examined directly.'" None of these
methods is without its problems with respect to the drawing of valid causal
inferences. Ideally, multiple methods and sources of data should be used to
shed light on the issue; the strengths of one approach might offset the
weaknesses of the other. Such a research agenda is neither easy to undertake
nor cheap. Nevertheless, as the critique of studies relying solely on jury
verdicts makes clear, valid conclusions about jury performance cannot
otherwise be made.
V
CONCLUSION

It is always harder to hit a moving target than a stationary one, and the
litigation system is a dynamic process. The rules controlling the process
change regularly; changes in substantive law interact with the procedural rules
to vary litigation tactics; attorney customs and negotiation methods change
regularly as well. It should not surprise us, therefore, that research into the
process fails to provide answers to the most current questions.
136. P. DANZON, supra note 11, in fact utilized this approach for malpractice cases.
137. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) (criminal juries), and Kalven, The Dignity
of the CivilJuny, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964) (civil juries), effectively utilized this approach.
138. The types of simulation include shadow juries, presentation of videotapes of actual trials,
and isolating simulations that vary in the degree of verisimilitude to the trial process but have the
advantage of allowing the researcher to test the effect of key variables against control conditions. V.
HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986). For a review of various methods of empirical research
relating to the jury, see R. MACCOUN, GETFING INSIDE THE BLACK Box: TOWARD A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING

OF CIviL JURY BEHAVIOR (1987).
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The process is not only dynamic, but complex. It is fair to say that we have
only a most general understanding of the significance of many key litigation
variables-including the role of the jury and the experience level of the
attorneys-and their impact on the resolution of the ordinary case. The
challenges for the empirical researcher are many. Hopefully, this article has
provided some benefit by articulating some of the many questions generated
by the present system. The greater challenge, of course, is going forward and
seeking some of the answers.

